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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by 
the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees on 
the board. This article examines the bias, conflicts, and external factors that impact board 
decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress.  It challenges the 
conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it suggests that, in certain 
circumstances, the company would benefit from having the shareholders’ perspective 
more actively represented on the board.  To that end, the article proposes a bylaw that 
would give shareholders the ability to nominate directors upon the occurrence of 
predefined events.  Such targeted proxy access would incentivize boards to manage 
difficult operational and financial situations more proactively, while creating a reasonable 
oversight mechanism for shareholders if those efforts fail.  The article also discusses 
ways for shareholders to use general proxy access in distressed situations to strengthen 
the shareholder perspective in, and add value to, boards’ negotiations with debtholders.  
Yet failing the utility of traditional, general proxy methodology, the article suggests that 
targeted proxy access is a more tailored solution that mitigates many of the concerns 
articulated in the proxy access debate and provides a better balance between management 
autonomy and accountability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The corporate boardroom is not for the faint of heart. Corporate directors frequently 
are called upon to make real time decisions involving complex financial and operational 
matters. The stakes are high, and the choices are hard.  Directors are required to act in the 
best interests of the company, but conflicts of interest, lenders or investors with different 
agendas, or other factors may influence their judgment.1  And once directors have made a 
decision and committed to action, it is frequently difficult to reverse course.2  
 
Consider RadioShack Corp., a 94-year old company sold through a chapter 11 
bankruptcy case and now existing as a shell of its former self.3  Prior to the bankruptcy, 
RadioShack was slow to innovate, suffered 11 consecutive quarters of losses, and 
experienced significant turnover in key executive positions. Yet despite these warning 
signs, RadioShack churned along and continued to hold onto hope of a turnaround.  The 
company’s last effort to achieve that objective was financed through a rescue loan 
package that ultimately led to the bankruptcy sale.  
 
Perhaps RadioShack was destined to fail:  the victim of an all-too-familiar creative 
destruction story of an industry (i.e., bricks and mortar electronics stores) that had 
outlived its useful life, being replaced by new, more modern forms of product delivery.4  
Alternatively, perhaps internal conflict or outside influences stymied the board of 
directors, which failed to implement a creative reconstruction plan that would have better 
positioned the company for the new economy.  Could a new or different perspective have 
presented better prospects of saving RadioShack?  This article suggests that the answer is 
“yes,” and it underscores the value of, and the role for, shareholder nominees on the 
board in such a situation.  It further suggests the use of a well-crafted proxy access bylaw 
to implement the proposal.5 
 
Boards of directors do represent the interests of shareholders generally, but that 
perspective can become lost in the complex and often time-sensitive situations facing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See infra Parts I.A, I.B. 
2 The difficulties in changing course may stem from a variety of factors, including operational challenges 
and commitment bias on the part of the directors and management team.  See infra notes 56-59 and 
accompanying text. 
3 For a detailed case study of RadioShack, see infra Part II.D.  The purchaser in the bankruptcy sale bought 
RadioShack’s trademark and 1,733 of RadioShack’s more than 4,000 stores.  See id.  See also Lisa 
Fickenscher, RadioShack Has a New Strategy After Its Brush with Death, N.Y. POST, Nov. 26, 2015 
(noting scope of bankruptcy sale).  The remaining stores were closed, causing thousands of employees to 
lose their jobs, lessors to lose rental income, and suppliers to lose a customer. 
4 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950) (explaining creative 
destruction generally as the “process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one”). 
5 In an ordinary election proxy, the company (through its current board) identifies individuals to nominate 
for open board seats and includes the names of these individuals in the company’s proxy materials, 
including the company’s proxy card.  Shareholders may use the proxy card to vote for directors in lieu of 
attending the annual meeting.  “Proxy access refers to shareholders’ ability to nominate directorial 
candidates of their choice to the corporation's proxy statement.”  Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of 
Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1260 (2009). 
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corporate boards, particularly in times of financial distress.  A targeted proxy access 
bylaw would allow eligible shareholders to nominate candidates for the board precisely at 
a time when others—lenders, distressed debt investors, or special interest groups—may 
have the board’s attention.6  A more direct shareholder perspective could act as a 
counterbalance to the external, frequently biased interests represented by these other 
players, providing boards with greater leverage in negotiations and possibly more 
restructuring alternatives.   
 
Shareholders of public companies are increasingly using shareholder proposals to 
seek bylaws that would grant proxy access to certain categories of shareholders in all 
director elections.7  The most common proxy access proposals allow shareholders owning 
at least three percent of the company’s stock for at least three consecutive years to 
nominate a certain number of director candidates.8  The nominating shareholder typically 
must make specific representations and disclosures in connection with the nomination, 
and the company must include the nominating shareholder’s statement in support of the 
nominees in its proxy materials.9  Not all companies, however, are willing to adopt such 
bylaws; indeed, not even all shareholders support proxy access on such a blanket basis. 
 
The views on proxy access vary both in the business community and academic 
literature.  For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) generally supports 
proxy access meeting certain criteria, including the three percent, three-year ownership 
provisions discussed above.10  In fact, ISS released guidelines indicating that it may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See infra Part II.B. 
7 See, e.g., Keir Gumbs, et al., The 2015 Proxy Season:  The Year of the Proxy, 29 INSIGHTS 1, 2 (July 
2015) (“For example, shareholders submitted only 22 proxy access proposals in 2012, 17 in 2013, and 17 
again in 2014. In 2015, however, there has been a sharp increase in the number of proxy access shareholder 
proposals—as of July 8, 2015 at least 108 proxy access shareholder proposals have been submitted.”).  The 
change in approach during the 2015 proxy season was facilitated, in part, by the City of New York’s Office 
of the Comptroller’s Boardroom Accountability Project.  See 2015 NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS 
PROXY ACCESS SHAREOWNER PROPOSAL, CITY OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, available at 
http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Model-Proxy-Access.pdf. 
8 These guidelines generally follow the proxy access rules announced by the SEC in 2010.  See infra 
Part III.B.  See also, e.g., SIMPSON THATCHER, PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS, MEMO SERIES:  THE 2015 
PROXY SEASON, July 30, 2015, available at http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-
source/memos/firmmemo_07_30_15_proxy-access-proposals.pdf (outlining the general terms of proxy 
access bylaws proposed to, and adopted by, companies); Bo Becker & Guhan Subramanian, Improving 
Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2013) (noting in the context of 2012 proxy season, “The 
two successful proposals both imposed an ownership threshold/holding period requirement of 3%/3 years, 
identical to the abandoned Rule 14a-11, while all of the unsuccessful proposals had lower thresholds, 
typically 1%/1 year.”).  
9  See generally SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PROXY ACCESS BYLAW DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS, 
Aug. 18, 2015 (providing a detailed explanation of common terms found in proxy access proposals), 
available at 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Proxy_Access_Bylaw_Developments_an
d_Trends.pdf.  See also 17 C.F.R. § 240-14n-101 (this schedule, Schedule 14N, applies to nominations 
under proxy access bylaws and includes various disclosures by the nominating shareholder). 
10  See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, U.S. PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
(EXCLUDING COMPENSATION-RELATED), FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Dec. 18, 2016) [“ISS PROXY 
VOTING POLICIES FAQS”]. See also Howard B. Dicker, ISS Proxy Access FAQs:  Problematic Proxy 
Access Provisions, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
Submission Draft – Not For Citation    92 IND. L.J. ___ (forthcoming) 
Comments Welcome 	  
© 2016 by Michelle M. Harner. 5 
recommend a vote against directors if a board’s implementation of proxy access contains 
certain provisions that it views as problematic.11  On the other side of the debate, the 
Business Roundtable has suggested that “‘companies may have no choice but to consider 
litigation to keep shareholders’ proxy access proposals off their ballots.’”12  The voting 
results on proposed proxy access bylaws suggest that institutional shareholders tend to 
support such proposals more readily than retail shareholders.13   Moreover, some large 
shareholders have adopted a case-by-case approach to assessing proxy access proposals.14 
 
Academics and other commentators acknowledge various advantages and 
disadvantages to proxy access.  Supporters argue that proxy access can facilitate greater 
director accountability, enhanced communications among directors and shareholders, and 
general governance efficiencies.15  Those who oppose proxy access emphasize that it can 
distract directors and management, allow special interests to gain board representation, 
and add unnecessary cost and delay to the election process.16  As with most worthy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
REGULATION, Jan. 5, 2016.  The other well-know proxy advisory firm, Glass Lewis, takes a similar 
position, generally supporting proxy access but scrutinizing proposals before making recommendations.  
See SIMPSON THATCHER, supra note 8, at 9-10. 
11 ISS suggests that it “may issue an adverse recommendation if a proxy access policy implemented or 
proposed by management contains material restrictions more stringent than those included in a majority-
supported proxy access shareholder proposal with respect to the following.”  See ISS PROXY VOTING 
POLICIES FAQS supra note 10, at 19.  The examples provided include ownership requirements above the 
three percent, three-year levels, aggregation limits above 20 shareholders, and restrictions on the number of 
directors to be nominated by shareholders below 20 percent of the board.  See id. 
12 Kaja Whitehouse, Shareholders Threaten Boards Over ‘Proxy Access’, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2015 
(quoting a response letter by the Business Roundtable). 
13 See, e.g., PRESS RELEASE, 2015 PROXY SEASON RESULTS SHOW THAT RETAIL INVESTORS VOTED 
AGAINST PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS, ACCORDING TO NEW REPORT FROM BROADRIDGE AND PWC US, 
BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC., Aug. 27, 2015 (“Of the over 80 proxy access proposals that 
came to a vote, 70% received the majority support of shareholders, averaging 57% of the shares voted. 
Retail investors voted their shares against proxy access in significant numbers, while institutions voted 61% 
of their shares in favor of such proposals.”). 
14 Institutional shareholders and private funds typically scrutinize proposals and consider the need for the 
bylaw and the terms of the proposal.  See, e.g., David Benoit, BlackRock Takes Its Own Advice on Proxy 
Access, MONEYBEAT, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2015 (noting that BlackRock was giving its shareholders an 
opportunity to vote on a proxy access proposal at its annual meeting and that, with respect to other 
companies, “BlackRock and others have said they’ll review each company’s proposed rule individually”). 
15 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 824-
30 (highlighting benefits of proxy access in context of increasing board-shareholder dialogue); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010) 
(advocating for proxy access as a default regulatory rule and outlining governance benefits); Fairfax, supra 
note 5 (positing that proxy access is more effective than other shareholder governance tools). 
16 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347 
(2011) (arguing that proxy access would have little impact on corporate governance); Joseph A. Grundfest, 
The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules:  Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361 (criticizing 
proxy access regulation); Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 
37 J. CORP. L. 387 (2012) (highlighting structural deficiencies in proxy access that undercut its utility).  See 
also J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access:  Delaware’s Future Reviewing Company 
Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 397-404 (2011) (reviewing various perspectives on 
shareholder empowerment and proxy access); Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware:  Why Congress Should 
Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013) (arguing that federal law should not 
regulate, among other things, proxy access). 
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debates, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle and depends on the particular 
company, its unique circumstances, and the makeup of its shareholder base. 
 
The targeted proxy access proposal suggested by this article strikes an appropriate 
balance among these competing considerations.  It would not grant proxy access in all 
cases.  To the extent a company is doing well, the management of the company should be 
in the hands of the board and management team without the potential distraction and 
costs of shareholder proxy access.  If the company experiences difficulties that are not 
timely addressed, however, shareholders should have greater access to the ballot to 
facilitate and assist in the company’s turnaround efforts.  Both boards and shareholders 
may be able to support such a balanced approach.  
 
Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) proposed a kind of 
contingent proxy access in 2003 that would have given shareholders the ability to 
nominate directors through the proxy statement under certain circumstances unrelated to 
a company’s financial health.17  Although some opposed the concept, others supported 
such a refined approach to proxy access.18  Similar to the SEC’s 2003 proposal, the 
targeted proxy access discussed in this article rests on the notion that not all companies 
may benefit from proxy access in all cases.  The targeted proxy access proposal, 
however, differs from the prior SEC proposal in two important respects:  companies and 
shareholders would implement such proxy access through private ordering (and not 
federal regulation), and they would tailor the triggers to the particular company, avoiding 
the complexity and uncertainty that plagues a one-size-fits all approach.19 
 
The effectiveness of targeted proxy access would depend largely on the terms of the 
bylaw itself, which should be drafted and evaluated on a company-by-company basis.  In 
general, the triggers for proxy access should be objective and well-defined—e.g., a 
material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a restructuring, refinancing, or 
forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a 
downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or a certain number of consecutive 
quarters of significant losses.20  The article draws on concepts and terminology familiar 
to public companies under the disclosure guidelines established by the SEC for the 
Form 8-K, Current Report, to guide the applicable triggers.21  The bylaw also should seek 
to align the interests of the company and the shareholders eligible to nominate directors 
once the bylaw is triggered.22   Accordingly, both the percentage and duration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See RELEASE NOS. 33-9136, 34-62764, FACILITATING SHAREHOLDER DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS, FINAL 
RULE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Aug. 25, 2010, at 46-47 (explaining the triggers under the 
2003 proposal as (i) one of the company’s nominees “received withhold votes from more than 35% of the 
votes cast at an annual meeting” or (ii) a shareholder proposal to adopt a shareholder nomination procedure 
“received more than 50% of the votes cast on that proposal at the meeting”) [“SEC RELEASE NOS. 33-9136, 
34-62764”]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 See infra Part III.B (including proposed language for a targeted proxy access bylaw). 
21 See Form 8-K, Current Report, 17 C.F.R. § 249-308 (requiring disclosures concerning, among other 
things, material definitive agreements and direct financial obligations). 
22 See infra Part III.B. 
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ownership should be considered, arguably following the three percent, three-year 
ownership model currently invoked in many proxy access proposals. 
 
In addition to proxy access mechanics, the article emphasizes the importance of 
detailed shareholder disclosures and position statements to the utility of targeted proxy 
access.  Shareholders nominating directors should be required to provide at least two 
kinds of individual disclosures:  (i) information about their own holdings to allow boards 
and other shareholders to evaluate whether the interests of the nominating shareholders 
are generally aligned with the company, or whether the nominating shareholders instead 
hold an adverse agenda; and (ii) the qualifications, experience, and other relevant 
information about their nominee(s).23  Shareholders also should endeavor to submit a 
position statement for the proxy materials that supports their nominees and explains their 
justifications for the requested change in leadership.  
 
As discussed in Part I.B, information provided to shareholders by management may 
be biased or limited in scope and perspective.24  The Darden Restaurants, Inc. case study 
set forth in Part II.C illustrates the problems posed by such limited disclosures and how 
more robust disclosures by a shareholder in the context of a proxy contest may assist a 
company and its shareholders.25  Admittedly, boards and management resist competing 
informational disclosures in proxy materials.  Nevertheless, on balance and in cases of 
underperforming management or distressed situations, such disclosures challenge 
management to make better decisions and encourage shareholders to hold management 
accountable if warranted.26  The case studies and targeted proxy access discussed in this 
article highlight the potential value to proxy access in distressed situations, whether under 
a targeted or a more general proxy access bylaw. The design of targeted proxy access, 
however, offers incentives and benefits not available through more traditional, general 
proxy access methodology.  
 
Despite the potential value of targeted proxy access, boards and shareholders may 
demur.27  Boards may be hesitant to cede control even when their performance or the 
challenges faced by the company suggest a new approach or perspective is necessary.  
Likewise, shareholders may believe the proposal is too limited and that they should have 
greater access to the ballot regardless of how the board and company are performing. 
Importantly, the balance struck by the proposal rests on an objective that benefits both 
sides:  a profitable and stable company.  A board of directors of a company with a 
targeted proxy access bylaw will have every incentive to manage the company’s 
operational and financial challenges more proactively and avoid the triggers of the bylaw.  
Shareholders of that company should be well served as a result, and they would have 
appropriate recourse if management fails in those efforts. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See id. (discussing proposed disclosures in more detail and their relation to the disclosures required by 
the SEC’s Schedule 14N under 17 C.F.R. § 240-14n-101). 
24 See infra Part I.B. 
25 See infra Part II.C. 
26 See infra Parts III.B and III.C. 
27 See infra Part III.C (examining the potential implementation challenges to the targeted proxy access 
proposal). 
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Part I of the article frames the primary underlying issue:  potentially ineffective or 
conflicted decisionmaking by boards of directors, particularly in times of financial 
distress.  This section provides an overview of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties 
and explains how those duties fail to provide adequate guidance in certain circumstances.  
Part II then discusses in more detail one such circumstance—boards making decisions in 
the presence or under the influence of activist investors.  Notably, both shareholder and 
debtholder activism can impact board decisionmaking.  This section sets forth two 
different case studies—one of Darden Restaurants, Inc. and one of RadioShack Corp.—to 
illustrate different approaches to activism and potential consequences for the targets.  
Part III draws on the prior sections, including the case studies, to develop the 
justifications for, and key features of, the targeted proxy access bylaw.  The article 
concludes by discussing the potential value for all stakeholders of the additional 
information and new perspectives offered by targeted proxy access and the presence of 
shareholder nominees on the boards of distressed companies.  
I. THE PROBLEM:  FIDUCIARIES SERVING MULTIPLE MASTERS  
 
A board of directors manages the affairs of the corporation for the benefit of the 
corporate entity and its shareholders.28  This division of management and ownership 
creates agency costs, as no one shareholder necessarily has the economic incentive to 
monitor the board and hold it accountable.29  Moreover, a board must possess a certain 
level of autonomy to govern a corporation effectively.30  Striking the appropriate balance 
between board autonomy and accountability is an ongoing challenge in corporate 
governance law.31 
 
A company experiencing financial distress perhaps illustrates this challenge most 
vividly.32  The board of a distressed company needs the financial flexibility to, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 State law generally delegates all management authority to the board of directors of the corporation.  See, 
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors…”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01(b) (“[A]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of 
the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction 
[of the board of directors].”).  A company’s insolvency may impact the beneficiaries of directors’ duties.  
See infra note 36. 
29 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. L. ECON. 
327 (1983); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate 
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
30 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the 
Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 425 (2001) (“Rather than being agents, directors play a role that 
more closely resembles that of an autonomous trustee or fiduciary who is charged with serving another’s 
interests.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 787 (2001). 
31 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 83, 109 (2004) (“Establishing the proper mix of deference and accountability thus emerges as the 
central problem in applying the business judgment rule to particular situations.”). 
32 For a general discussion of issues facing boards of directors of financially distressed companies, see 
Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205 
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example, incur additional debt or refinance old debt; change operational course; and 
implement layoffs, consolidations, closures, or other restructuring decisions.  
Nevertheless, the extent of each of these measures and what is reasonable and appropriate 
under the circumstances are in many respects subjective determinations. 33   Many 
questions arise:  Is the board jeopardizing the long-term health of the company by 
implementing short-term remedies?  Is the board moving too slowly or too quickly?  Who 
is benefiting most from the board’s decisions—shareholders, creditors, or the board? 
 
State corporate law attempts to guide a board’s determinations in these and other 
scenarios through either common law or statutory fiduciary duties.34  Board members and 
senior officers generally owe a duty of care and loyalty to the corporate entity and its 
shareholders.35  Financial distress not only blurs the boundaries of these fiduciary 
duties,36 but it also creates opportunities for conflicts of interest and self-dealing on the 
part of multiple parties.  This section examines existing checks on a board’s autonomy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2014).  See also Stephen J. Lubben, The Board’s Duty to Keep Its Options Open, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 817, 
819 (“[S]tate corporate law imposes a duty on the board to carefully consider any decision that will 
foreclose a future board’s choices. In times of financial distress, this duty includes an obligation to 
carefully consider the effects of a particular decision on future restructuring options.”). 
33 See, e.g., Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court and Beyond:  
Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 181 (2015) 
(examining, among other things, board decisions underlying creditor and shareholder litigation in the 
distressed context). 
34 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 7-13 (2010) (describing general duties of fiduciaries).  Whether 
directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties are based in common law or statute (or come combination of the 
two) varies by state.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (“A director shall discharge his duties as a 
director, including his duties as a member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business 
judgment of the best interests of the corporation.”); Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 
277, 284 (1999) (“Code § 13.1-690(A) does not abrogate the common law duties of a director. It does, 
however, set the standard by which a director is to discharge those duties.”).  See also MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT §§ 8.30, 8.31 (2011) (standards of conduct and liability for directors); Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s 
Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (2011) (“The [Delaware] General Assembly has never 
addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, leaving that subject entirely to the judiciary, which has 
likewise largely neglected these duties. The General Assembly, however, has addressed the fiduciary duties 
of corporate directors, but not to permit curtailing or negating those duties.”).  
35 See generally Silberglied, supra note 33.  See also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 
2009) (“In the past, we have implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors. We 
now explicitly so hold.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). 
36 Questions arise concerning whether directors continue to owe their fiduciary duties solely to the 
corporation and shareholders as the corporate entity approaches insolvency.  Some courts suggest that such 
duties may be owed to the corporate enterprise, which includes stakeholders other than shareholders.  The 
Delaware Supreme Court has clarified that “the creditors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent 
or in the zone of insolvency have no right, as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty against the corporation’s directors.”  N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007).  See also Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 894 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]e hold that there is no fiduciary duty prescribed under California law that is 
owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue of its operating in the ‘zone’ or ‘vicinity’ of 
insolvency.”).  The Delaware Chancery Court has further explained that creditors may bring derivative 
claims against corporate officers and directors for alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties when the 
corporation is insolvent and that such standard does not require the corporation to be “irretrievably 
insolvent.”  Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, Case No. 6990-VCL (Del. Ch. May 4, 2015). 
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and accountability, highlighting weaknesses that often lead to corporate governance 
failures and shareholder loss. 
 
A. Overview of a Board’s Fiduciary Duties 
 
Corporate board members and senior officers are fiduciaries.37  These individuals 
generally owe fiduciary duties, including duties of care and loyalty, to the corporate 
entity and its shareholders.38  In theory, such obligations should deter misconduct and 
produce beneficial outcomes.  In practice, however, fiduciary duties are limited in scope 
and effect,39 as well as by the reality that the decisionmakers are human,40 and there 
rarely is one correct answer.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Silberglied, supra note 33.   
38 See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) 
(“It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986) 
(“[T]he directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.”).  
Although most commentators agree that directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, they 
do not agree that such duties also run to the corporation’s shareholders.  See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 731 
(2006) (“There is very little in corporate law that supports [shareholder wealth maximization] and much 
that cuts against it.”); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) 
(arguing against a shareholder primacy norm).  For a thoughtful review of the competing theories of 
corporate governance and a recommendation for a more nimble, less board-centric approach, see Anthony 
J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of ‘Team’ Production of Corporate Governance, 
38 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 365 (2015).  See also supra note 36 (discussing directors’ duties in the context 
of insolvency). 
39 See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 786 (2011) (arguing 
that “the board of directors in a large public corporation is ineffective to perform the functions assigned to 
it and should thus be eliminated in favor of a governance system that more accurately reflects corporate 
decision making”).  For in-depth discussions of limitations on board effectiveness based on board 
composition, see Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1435, 1453-56 (2011); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
127 (2010). 
40 A rich literature exists examining the human component of corporate boards.  See, e.g., Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of 
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1807–10 (2001); Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased 
Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509, 510–14 (2008); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the 
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 83–84, 99–108; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding 
Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 363–65 (2007); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into 
the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The 
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2–4 (2003); Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral 
Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
581, 583–85 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 
107 (1997–1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent 
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 285, 288 (2004); Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance, 39 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 613, 614, 619 (2005); Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 286–89 (2009).  For an interesting proposal to use “board service providers” in 
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The duty of care requires board members and officers to serve the corporation in 
good faith and with the same level of diligence, care, and skill of a reasonably prudent 
businessperson.41  Although the standard sounds stringent, a board’s duty of care and 
resulting decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, which is a rebuttable 
presumption that the board acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the best 
interests of the corporation.42  Plaintiffs typically find it difficult to overcome the 
business judgment rule and succeed in litigation against corporate directors and officers, 
unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate a breach of the duty of loyalty.43  The duty of 
loyalty is fairly broad, and it encompasses self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and bad 
faith.44  Importantly, alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty are not protected by the 
business judgment rule. 
 
The literature concerning fiduciary duty litigation suggests that relatively few 
judgments are entered against corporate directors and officers.45  Rather, such litigation 
often is resolved in favor of the defendants at the motion to dismiss or summary 
judgment stage, or settled prior to trial.46  Most of the literature also questions the value 
of any judgment or settlement to the corporation because—particularly in the settlement 
context—the monetary component typically covers primarily attorneys’ fees, and the 
promised corporate governance reforms are either of nominal impact or already in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lieu of natural persons, see Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us:  
Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2014). 
41 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[I]t appears that directors of a 
corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful 
and prudent men would use in similar circumstances. Their duties are those of control, and whether or not 
by neglect they have made themselves liable for failure to exercise proper control depends on the 
circumstances and facts of the particular case.”). 
42 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“The business judgment rule has been 
well formulated by Aronson and other cases that ‘[i]t is a presumption that in making a business decision 
the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interests of the corporation.’ Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the 
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a 
manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly 
negligent process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.” (citation 
omitted)). 
43 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whatever the terminology, the fact is that 
liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance 
to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labelled [sic] the business 
judgment rule.”). 
44 See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to 
cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases 
where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith. . . . ‘[a] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation 
unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.’”) (quoting 
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
45 See Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation, 57 KAN. L. REV. 39, 40 (2008) (“Shareholder derivative litigation, however, rarely 
succeeds in holding directors liable for their decisions.”).  
46 Id. at 59 (“Under any formulation of the business judgment rule, it operates as a defense asserted in 
shareholder derivative actions that challenge a decision made by a corporation’s board of directors.  
Procedurally, defendants have been allowed to assert their business judgment defense on a motion to 
dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, and at trial.”) (citations omitted). 
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place.47  Two notable exceptions to this general rule are in the context of governance 
failures and securities litigation:  the outside directors of Worldcom and Enron agreed to 
pay approximately $24 million and $13 million, respectively, to settle securities class 
action litigation against them relating to collapse of their companies.48 
 
Despite its low success rate, fiduciary duty litigation arguably has a strong deterrent 
effect.  No director or officer wants to be embroiled in years of very public litigation, 
even if they know they likely will succeed in the end.49  Moreover, fiduciary duties do 
provide general guidance for directors and officers—a basic framework for making the 
tough decisions.  Unfortunately, the flexibility in this framework may allow external 
factors to compromise its utility. 
 
Consider the following two scenarios:  In the first, the board is evaluating a sale of 
the company to an insider.  In the second, the board is contemplating a rescue-financing 
package that will significantly increase the corporation’s leverage and decrease its 
operational discretion.  In both scenarios, the board must balance the interests of the 
company and its shareholders.  Most boards also will at least analyze the impact of the 
transaction on employees, officers, creditors, and perhaps their own professional careers.  
The influence of each respective factor on the board’s decision will depend to some 
extent on the governing law,50 but likely also will be driven in some part by the parties at 
the negotiating table.   
 
Notably, existing best practices treat these two scenarios very differently.  Many 
corporations will utilize independent board committees or special approval procedures for 
interested party transactions to mitigate the influence of external factors in the first 
scenario.51  Such protective measures are not the norm, however, in the second scenario.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007) (studying risk 
factors relevant to directors’ and officers’ liability insurance markets and analyzing merits and results of 
director and officer litigation); Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom:  An Empirical 
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) (discussing general perception that shareholder derivative 
litigation lacks meaningful value for corporate shareholders and presenting evidence that such litigation 
may enhance corporate governance measures at targeted firms). 
48 See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (study discusses 
Worldcom and Enron settlements, but finds that such personal liability for outside directors is the exception 
rather than the rule).  
49 See id. at 1056 (“The principal threats to outside directors . . . are the time, aggravation, and potential 
harm to reputation that a lawsuit can entail.”). 
50 Although many states have statutes that permit boards to consider the interests of stakeholders other than 
shareholders in making decisions, commentators debate the impact of these statutes (and, notably, 
Delaware does not have a constituency statute).  See, e.g., ANDREW KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 195 (2011); Leo E Strine, Jr., The 
Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure 
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, ___ WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2576389.  See also supra note 36 
(discussing directors’ duties in the context of insolvency). 
51 See, e.g., Scott V. Simpson & Katherine Brody, The Evolving Role of Special Committees in M&A 
Transactions: Seeking Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Controlling Shareholder 
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Yet directors in the second scenario may face significantly more pressure from particular 
interest groups, increased opportunities for conflicts of interest and self-dealing, and 
arguments that some duties are owed to creditors if the company is in fact insolvent.  The 
next section considers these competing factors and their potential consequences for the 
company and its shareholders. 
 
B. Additional Challenges for a Board of a Distressed Company 
 
A company experiencing financial distress can invoke a number of alternatives to 
ameliorate its distress and return to profitability.52  It can implement operational changes 
that reduce costs and streamline production or the provision of services.  It can sell non-
core assets or pursue strategic partners.  It also can explore balance sheet adjustments to 
enhance liquidity or obtain additional financing until the underlying source of the distress 
is resolved.  Financing alternatives can include a new debt or equity offering, an out-of-
court workout with existing lenders, a refinancing with new lenders, or an in-court 
reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.53   
 
In any event, the board of a distressed company must make difficult choices.  The 
board must, for example, weigh the interests of creditors and shareholders.  Financial 
distress exemplifies the traditional conflict between creditors and shareholders, with 
creditors often desiring a more conservative course sufficient to pay off the debt and 
shareholders often wanting more aggressive action resulting in debt repayment and equity 
value for shareholders.54   The board also likely will consider the interests of the 
company’s employees and the company’s relationships with suppliers and communities.55  
The one alternative that in theory could satisfy all of these competing interests—i.e., 
resolving the company’s financial distress out-of-court through a workout or refinancing 
that does not require significant closures or layoffs—may not be attainable.  
Nevertheless, a board may pursue such an alternative at all costs. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Transactions and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 69 BUS. LAW. 1116 (2014); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
52 See generally JOHN WILLIAM BUTLER, JR., NAVIGATING TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT: THE DIRECTORS’ AND 
OFFICERS’ GUIDE TO RESTRUCTURING (2010) (reviewing frequent causes of distress and alternatives for 
resolving it). 
53  See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist 
Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 (Fall 2008) (reviewing each alternative for resolving 
financial distress). 
54 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties in Financially 
Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP. L. 491, 514 (2007) (“Once a 
corporation issues debt, shareholders have an incentive to over-invest in risky projects, while creditors have 
an incentive to avoid risk because shareholders, as residual claimants, share the risk of loss with creditors 
but reap the gains from success, they have an appetite for risk that increases with leverage.”).  See also 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing shareholder-bondholder conflict generally). 
55 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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In such steadfast pursuit, a board may be justified in its approach, or it may be 
blinded by heuristics, denial, or the influence of a particular constituent.56  For example, a 
board and the officers may believe that they have the talent and experience to turn around 
the company’s financial situation if simply given enough time.57  They may be committed 
to a particular course of action that they designed and implemented.58  They may not 
recognize the severity of the company’s financial condition.59  Notably, some or all of 
these and similar conditions may cause a board to back the company into a negotiating 
corner with lenders, creating a “win-win” situation for the lender and a “partial win-
complete loss” situation for the company and its stakeholders.   
 
Why do these conditions create a win-win for the lenders only?  It boils down to 
basic negotiating theory:  the lenders have something that the board desperately wants 
and will give most anything to get; the board also likely has little to offer the lenders in 
return.60  The result often is a workout or new financing package that stacks the deck in 
favor of the lenders, with extremely tight covenants for the company and veto rights for 
the lenders.  If the company is able to use the financing to resolve the underlying distress, 
everyone wins, including the lenders, who will be repaid in full at extremely high rates.  
If the company is unsuccessful, the lenders still win, but in this scenario they do not share 
the victory.  The lenders likely will be able to take over the company and either continue 
to run it for their own benefit (after downsizing or fixing any operational issues), sell it as 
a going concern (typically at a large profit), or foreclose on the assets for a recovery to 
the exclusion of all other stakeholders.61 
 
From the lenders’ perspective, the win-win scenario described above is fair and 
equitable, as all parties are getting exactly what they bargained for.  Indeed, the lenders 
generally are entitled to the benefit of their bargain.   From the company’s perspective, a 
win for the lenders only likely means a loss—perhaps significant losses—for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See supra note 40. 
57 See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin, Behavioral Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2001, at 113, 117–
18 (discussing overconfidence bias and poor corporate decision-making); Dan Lovallo & Daniel 
Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions, HARVARD BUS. REV., 
July 2003, at 56, 58 (discussing impact of cognitive biases on business decisions). 
58 See Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 
9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796–97 (2003) (“[F]raming bias is the tendency to view a given problem in 
different terms depending on the perspective from which the problem is viewed.”) (discussing framing and 
anchoring biases). 
59 See Harner & Griffin, supra note 32, at 208 (explaining management’s tendency to deny signs of 
financial distress and noting that “[o]strich syndrome refers to management’s tendency to stick its 
collective head in the sand and ignore the warning signs of financial distress until it is too late to effectively 
resolve that distress.”). 
60 See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:  Dealing with Power 
Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 19 (2000) (“In most relationships, power 
flows from the more dependent to the less dependent party.”).  For a general discussion of negotiating 
leverage in transactional settings, see DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS 
NEGOTIATOR (2011). 
61 This strategy often is referred to as “loan to own.”  See generally Michelle M. Harner et al., Distressed 
Debt Investing, in ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: INSTRUMENTS, PERFORMANCE, BENCHMARKS, AND 
STRATEGIES 303 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck eds., 2013) (exploring investment strategies with respect 
to distressed companies). 
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company’s other stakeholders.  In particular, the company’s existing shareholders will be 
wiped out, existing creditors (other than the winning lenders) will receive little if any 
recovery on their claims, and many (if not all) of the company’s employees will be laid 
off.62  Absent fraud or misconduct, these losses are not the fault of the winning lenders; 
these losses are the risk for which the company bargained.  The crux of the issue thus lies 
in the bargain itself.  It also suggests that the board and officers need additional 
information and assistance in making pre-insolvency decisions.   
 
This suggestion does not mean that boards are incapable of serving the corporation’s 
interests.  Many boards are very effective, and most directors work hard to try to get it 
right.  The corporate governance landscape is, however, complicated.  Particularly as a 
company approaches distress, directors are called upon to separate noise from substance.  
The presence of activists can blur this distinction.  Accordingly, the article next analyzes 
the role of activists before evaluating tools to improve board decisions. 
II. CONFOUNDING FACTORS:  ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS AND DEBTHOLDERS 
 
Historically, corporate activism has had a negative connotation and has been most 
frequently associated with corporate raiders and vultures.63  “Activists” are viewed as 
threats to existing management with an interest only in short-term profitability and self-
benefiting transactions.  The corporate raiders of the 1980s often are held up as the face 
of activism, and “greed is good” is thrown out as its slogan.64 
 
Although there is undoubtedly some truth to that notion, activists are not a 
monolithic group, and some of their tactics may work to benefit not only themselves, but 
also other corporate stakeholders.  This part examines the role of shareholder and 
debtholder activists in corporate America and concludes with a detailed case study of 
each. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In a bankruptcy case or out-of-court liquidation scenario, creditors are generally paid according to federal 
bankruptcy law or state law priorities, which pays secured creditors first, followed by general unsecured 
creditors, followed last by equity holders.  There are frequently multiple tranches of creditors within each 
general category, and each class of creditors must be paid in full before a lower class can receive any 
distributions.  Consequently, in many instances, unsecured creditors receive nominal recoveries and equity 
holders receive nothing.  In addition, employees lose their jobs and trade creditors lose business.  See, e.g., 
Circuit City Unplugged:  Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?, Hearing before the H. Subcomm. 
on Commercial and Administrative Law, 111th Cong. 96 (2009); Written Testimony of David R. Jury: ACB 
Field Hearing Before the ABI Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, at 1 (Mar. 14, 2013) (“Between 
1998 and 2003, the domestic steel industry experienced a crisis brought on by a tide of imports which 
flooded the market and drove steel prices down to 20-year lows.  The result was 44 bankruptcies, 
18 liquidations and the loss of 55,000 jobs.”), available at www.commission.abi.org. 
63 For a general discussion of the characterization of activists as raiders, see Nicole M. Boyson & Robert 
M. Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV. DERIVATIVES RESEARCH 169 
(2011); Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders:  The New Barbarians at the Gate, 89 WASH. 
U.L. REV. 155, 164-67 (2011). 
64 See generally ROBERT SLATER, THE TITANS OF TAKEOVER (1999) (analyzing transactions pursued by 
activists in 1980s); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 275 (reviewing literature on 
activist transactions in 1980s). 
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A. Shareholder Activism 
 
Most shareholders, particularly those owning stock in larger corporations, are 
passive investors.65  They make a fixed monetary investment when they purchase their 
stock, and they then rely on the corporation’s board and officers, and perhaps other 
investors, to manage and grow the value of their investment.  Moreover, many 
shareholders hold stock in larger corporations through mutual funds or other third-party 
managed investment vehicles, thereby further removing them from active management of 
the company.66  This passive investor model exacerbates the agency costs associated with 
the American model of the corporation (i.e., separation of ownership and management).67 
 
Not all shareholders, however, are passive investors.  Some shareholders 
strategically invest in companies where they perceive a need for change.68  That change 
may involve replacing management or the board; pursuing acquisitions or asset 
dispositions; restructuring operations; or encouraging the company to adopt other 
measures that arguably would unlock value if implemented correctly.  Although some 
such changes could improve the value of the company over the longer term, many 
changes have a shorter-term focus.69 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For an interesting commentary on the performance of activist versus passive shareholders in 2014, see 
Stephen Gandel, Passive Investors Crushed the Activists in 2014, FORBES, Jan. 9, 2015 (“If you put your 
money in the S&P 500 and let it sit there for the entirety of 2014, your portfolio would have gone up 12%. 
No proxy fights needed.”), available at http://fortune.com/2015/01/09/activist-investors-performance-
2014/. 
66 See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility, Apr. 19, 2013 
(“For example, the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the 
past six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67% in 2010.1 The shift has 
come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooled-investment vehicles, 
such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs)”), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808. 
67 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
68 For a general overview of strategies pursued by activist shareholders, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The 
Long-Term Effects of Shareholder Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); Brian R. Cheffins & John 
Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58–59 
(2011); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 
1729 (2008).  See also ACTIVIST INSIGHT, ACTIVIST INVESTING:  AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 10-12 (2015) (detailing strategies and targets of shareholder activism and 
observing, “Demands for board change have long accounted for the lion’s share of activist campaigns, with 
M&A-related activity a close second. But a spike in balance-sheet activism in 2013 had returned to normal 
in 2014, with activists diversifying their objectives to include other governance and more business strategy 
demands.”). 
69 For an example of the debate concerning the impact of activist shareholders and short-termism, compare 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling 
Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM L. REV. 449 (2014) with Lucian A. Bebchuk, The 
Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013). 
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For example, some activist investors call upon boards to use cash reserves to 
repurchase stock or make larger dividend payments to shareholders.70  This move pushes 
value out to shareholders, but may do so at the expense of the company’s longer-term 
interests—e.g., the company accordingly may invest less in research and development, or 
in maintenance and upgrade initiatives.  The company’s cash reserves also may 
ultimately prove insufficient to sustain the company through an economic downturn or 
other unforeseen event.  Moody’s has warned bondholders that such uses of a company’s 
cash may weaken the company’s longer-term prospects and, consequently, its ratings.71 
 
Activist investors also analyze a board’s operational decisions, from the selection of 
director candidates to how the company makes its products.  For example, Elliott 
Management sent a letter to the board of Citrix Systems suggesting a new plan for 
operational and managerial improvements.72  This letter stated in part: 
 
Today, Elliott is formally requesting a meeting with the Board to share the 
details of an operational plan that we believe will create tremendous value 
for stockholders. What we call the “New Citrix” Operating Plan (the “New 
Citrix Plan”) was developed through exhaustive research and with the help 
of a full team of operating partners with proven experience turning around 
software companies….  The New Citrix Plan is based upon two driving 
principles: the need for i) fundamental change and ii) effective oversight. 
The key components for fundamental change are as follows:  1) 
Implementation of Operational Best Practices: Citrix’s cost structure is the 
result of years of layered complexity and expenses. The structure has 
become highly inefficient in terms of actual cost and is also ineffective at 
generating revenue growth. We have identified numerous opportunities 
throughout the organization for significant improvement, which we 
believe will result in both superior revenue performance and a more 
efficient use of resources….73 
 
The letter identified product management as one such opportunity for operational 
improvement:  “[Citrix’s] product portfolio is too broad for its scale and contains far too 
many underperforming product lines that consume valuable resources, have low or 
negative (i.e., loss-making) return profiles, and serve as distractions.”74  Citrix’s stock 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See, e.g., Vipal Monga et al., As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend More on Buybacks Than Factories, 
WALL ST. J., May 26, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-
shareholders-1432693805. 
71 Moody’s Investors Services, Announcement: Moody’s: Activist Shareholders Gain Momentum in 2015; 
Mainly Negative for Credit Investors, Apr. 9, 2015 (“‘In many cases, shareholder activists pursue short-
term initiatives like share buybacks or special dividends, which have negative implications for credit 
investors.’”).  See also Monga, et al., supra note 70.   
72  Elliott Sends Letter to Citrix Board of Directors, BUSINESSWIRE, June 11, 2015, available at 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150611005626/en/Elliott-Sends-Letter-Citrix-Board-
Directors#.VZ6jkmCIVFI. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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price rose after Elliott announced its 7.1% ownership stake and its communications with 
the Citrix board.75  
 
Activism that evaluates and questions a board’s decisions may provide valuable 
oversight and discipline.  For this reason, some commentators herald activism as a 
necessary and meaningful check on management that enhances management’s 
accountability.76  Others perceive activism as a channel for shareholder engagement with 
management.  As SEC Chair Mary Jo White observed in her comments on activism:  
“Increasingly, companies are talking to their shareholders, including so-called activist 
ones. That, in my view, is generally a very good thing. Increased engagement is 
important and a growing necessity for many companies today.”77  Academic studies also 
suggest that activism can enhance shareholder value.78 
 
Not all commentators agree, however, that shareholder activists are a positive 
influence on corporate boards.79  These commentators raise concerns regarding, among 
other things, activists’ motivation and their typical focus on short-term returns.80  The 
potential misalignment among the interests of the activist, other shareholders, and 
corporate entity does undercut any generalization about constructive activism.  
Nevertheless, as discussed below in Part III, with appropriate safeguards, activism may 
circumstantially work to serve the interests of the corporation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See Tiernan Ray, Citrix Surges 7%:  Price Targets Zoom as Activists Elliott Call for Change, BARRON’S 
TECH TRADER DAILY, June 11, 2015, available at 
http://blogs.barrons.com/techtraderdaily/2015/06/11/citrix-surges-7-price-targets-zoom-as-activists-elliott-
call-for-change/.  Citrix responded to Elliott’s letter with the following statement:  “Citrix has always 
maintained an ongoing dialogue with our shareholders, and we welcome their input. We will review 
Elliott’s suggestions and respond as we do with all shareholders who engage with us. The Citrix Board and 
management team continually evaluate ideas to drive shareholder value and are committed to acting in the 
best interests of all our shareholders.”  Financial Release, CITRIX COMMENTS ON LETTER FROM ELLIOTT 
MANAGEMENT, June 11, 2015, available at https://www.citrix.com/news/financial-releases/june-
2015/citrix-comments-on-letter-from-elliott-management.html.  
76 See supra note 68. 
77 Chair Mary Jo White, A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015, Tulane University Law School 27th 
Annual Corporate Law Institute, March 19, 2015, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html. 
78 See supra note 68.  See also Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4(3) FOUNDATIONS AND 
TRENDS IN FINANCE 185 (2009) (reviewing literature).  For a general description of data showing a short-
termism effect, see Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 
68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013). 
79 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, 
THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, Feb. 26, 
2013, available at http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-
company-wreck-the-economy/; P. Alexander Quimby, Addressing Corporate Short-Termism Through 
Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2013); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, 
and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012).  See also Roe, supra note 78, at 987-991 (reviewing 
literature on short-termism and offering theoretical and factual counter-arguments). 
80  See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long 
Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2010). 
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B. Debtholder Activism 
 
Investors not only pursue activist agendas as shareholders, but also as debtholders.81  
In addition, an investor may hold both stock and debt and use that multi-tranche 
investment to further its activist interests and influence over the company.82  An activist 
debtholder typically has the greatest leverage once the target company starts to 
experience financial distress or some kind of liquidity event.  In those instances, the 
debtholder can try to extract governance or transactional concessions from the board in 
exchange for a forbearance agreement or restructuring of the underlying debt.83 
 
One common activist debtholder strategy is the “loan-to-own” situation.84  An 
investor will extend new or additional credit to (or agree to restructure its existing credit 
with) a company in exchange for covenants in the loan documents that provide the 
investor with indirect control over decisions such as whether the company can sell assets, 
pay certain other debt obligations, incur additional obligations, or file a bankruptcy case.  
The financial covenants also are set fairly tight, giving the company a chance—but not 
too great of a chance—of meeting its restructuring objectives.  The failure of the 
company to do so basically turns over control of the company and ownership of the assets 
to the activist debtholder. 
 
A loan-to-own strategy can be affected in or outside of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case.  
For example, in 2012, Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc., an ethanol producer in 
the Midwest, defaulted on its loan obligations and, after receiving a short forbearance 
agreement from its lenders, initiated a debt-for-equity exchange with its lenders to 
resolve the default.85  The lenders received 92.5% of the company’s stock, with the 
remaining equity held by pre-existing shareholders. 86   Aventine’s lenders included 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See Harner, supra note 53 (explaining activist debtholder strategies).  See also, e.g., Casey & Henderson, 
supra note 38 (discussing creditor influence on firm governance); Harner et al., Activist Investors, 
Distressed Companies, and Value Uncertainty, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167 (2014) (empirical study 
of role of hedge fund investors in distressed debt; reviewing strategies and potential impact of such funds); 
Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate 
Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 118 (2009) (discussing creditor influence on firm governance)]; 
Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES 511 (2009). 
82 See infra Part II.D (RadioShack case study).  See also Harner, supra note 63, at 162 (providing examples 
of such investment strategies). 
83 See Harner, supra note 53, at 712-18 (explaining strategies of activist debtholders). 
84 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  See also Harner, supra note 63, at 165-69 (providing 
examples of a loan-to-own strategy). 
85  See Press Release, AVENTINE RENEWABLE ENERGY HOLDINGS, INC. ENTERS INTO A SIGNIFICANT 
RESTRUCTURING TRANSACTION WITH MEMBERS OF ITS LENDER GROUP, Aug. 20, 2012, available at 
http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2012/08/20/483287/10002526/en/Aventine-Renewable-Energy-
Holdings-Inc-Enters-Into-a-Significant-Restructuring-Transaction-With-Members-of-Its-Lender-
Group.html; Aventine Lenders Take Over Distressed Company in Out-of-Court Restructuring, 
LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, Aug. 21, 2012 (hereinafter “Aventine Lenders Take Over”), available at 
http://www.leveragedloan.com/aventine-lenders-take-over-distressed-company-in-out-of-court-
restructuring/. 
86 See Aventine Lenders Take Over, supra note 85. 
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several hedge funds and private equity firms.87  The CEO appointed by the lenders after 
the change in the ownership was a consultant to several private equity firms with 
extensive turnaround experience.88  In July 2015, Aventine merged with Pacific Ethanol, 
an ethanol producer in the Western United States.89  
 
Alternatively, lenders can extend postbankruptcy (a/k/a debtor in possession) 
financing to the company to fund a chapter 11 case designed to sell the company to the 
lenders under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.90  A section 363 sale can be 
accomplished fairly quickly under existing law, and lenders can acquire exceptionally 
clean title to the assets through a sale free and clear of all liens and encumbrances under 
section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.91  The potential downside to this strategy under 
chapter 11 is that most bankruptcy courts require the company to subject the lenders’ bid, 
which frequently is a credit bid of the amount owed by the company under the loan 
documents, to a public auction process.  For example, an affiliate of Silver Point Capital, 
which was pursuing a loan-to-own strategy and was the stalking horse bidder in a 
chapter 11 sale process, lost its attempt to acquire print company Standard Register Co.92  
Silver Point’s credit bid was $275 million, and the winning bid, submitted by the Taylor 
Company, was $307 million.93 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See id. 
88 The biography of Mark Beemer, CEO of Aventine Renewable, explains that “Beemer is an advisor to 
numerous private equity firms in the ethanol space; he is a member of the Turnaround Management 
Association, the RFA, and the National Grain and Feed Association.”  Aventine Renewable Energy, Inc. 
Management Team, available at http://www.aventinerei.com/en/about/management_team/. 
89 See Press Release, STOCKHOLDERS APPROVE MERGER OF PACIFIC ETHANOL AND AVENTINE, June 11, 
2015, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/stockholders-approve-merger-of-pacific-ethanol-
and-aventine-2015-06-11; Press Release, PACIFIC ETHANOL COMPLETES AVENTINE MERGER, July 1, 2015, 
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/pacific-ethanol-completes-aventine-merger-2015-07-01. 
90 Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor, with court approval, to provide certain protections 
to lenders extending credit to the debtor postpetition.  11 U.S.C. § 364.  Accordingly, lenders often have an 
incentive to extend such credit.  See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1906 (2004) (“[T]he generous terms offered to DIP 
financers have encouraged lenders to make loans to cash-starved debtors, and that these lenders have used 
their leverage to fill a governance vacuum that was created by the enactment of the 1978 Code.”).  This 
postpetition financing also may be necessary to fund the debtor’s chapter 11 case to the point of a sale of 
the company in the case.  In fact, the terms of the postpetition facility may require such a sale. 
91 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (authorizing asset sales out of the ordinary course of business and free and clear 
of any liens and interests in such assets, respectively, under certain circumstances).  Under Bankruptcy 
Rule 2002(a)(2), a debtor typically must provide 21 days’ notice by mail of “a proposed use, sale or lease 
of property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of business, unless the court for cause shown 
shortens the time or directs another method of giving notice.”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2).  Nevertheless, 
courts may approve proposed asset sales on a much quicker basis.  See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings 
Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2008) (sale approved within seven days of petition date); Melissa 
B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 
123 YALE L.J. 862 (2013) (discussing issues with quick asset sales in bankruptcy).   
92 See Motion for Sale of Property Free and Clear of Liens under Section 363(f), In re Standard Register 
Company, Case No. 15-10541, Docket No. 23 (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015).  See also Peg Brickley, 
Standard Register Files for Bankruptcy with Plans for Sale, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 12, 2015, 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/standard-register-files-for-bankruptcy-with-plans-for-sale-
1426164844. 
93 See Order (A) Authorizing the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets Free and Clear of All 
Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Interests; (II) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment of Certain 
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Similar to shareholder activism, commentators debate the utility of debtholder 
proactivity.94  Debtholder activism that identifies and replaces ineffective or fraudulent 
management or helps management recognize the advantages of rightsizing the company’s 
operations through a restructuring may add value for the corporate entity.  Debtholder 
activism that is pursued, however, solely for the economic interests of the activist may 
significantly undervalue the company or dismantle a company with other viable 
restructuring alternatives, provided that the company was given sufficient time to 
restructure.  These risks exist because a debtholder looking to buy the company wants to 
pay as little as possible, which frequently results in a low valuation that wipes out all 
junior creditors and shareholders.95  Likewise, a debtholder that wants to own the 
company for strategic reasons (e.g., to prevent competition with another portfolio 
company, to capitalize on synergies with a certain aspect of the target company’s 
business) may not only undervalue the company, but also significantly affect the 
company’s employee and vendor relationships. 
 
The following section details two different situations involving faltering companies 
and activist investors.  These case studies illustrate the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of activism in this context.  They also inform the proposal made in this article 
to enhance the prospects of distressed companies and their stakeholders through targeted 
proxy access. 
 
C. Case Study:  Darden Restaurants, Inc. 
 
Darden Restaurants, Inc. traces its origins to Bill Darden, who opened his first 
restaurant at the age of 19 in 1938.96  Since that time, the company has expanded and 
contracted and changed ownership several times.  Activist investors have influenced at 
least some of these changes, particularly in recent years. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (III) Granting Certain Related Relief, In re Standard 
Register Company, Case No. 15-10541, Docket No. 698 (Bankr. D. Del. June 19, 2015).  See also Randall 
Chase, Judge Set to OK Sale of Standard Register to Taylor Corp., ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 17, 2015, 
available at http://www.startribune.com/judge-set-to-ok-sale-of-standard-register-to-taylor-
corp/307984521/. 
94 See, e.g., HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS (2000); Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. 
Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1997); 
Alon Brav et al., supra note 68; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement 
of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281–322 (2009).  
95 For example, an activist debtholder often will seek to purchase the company’s assets in a going concern 
bankruptcy sale by credit bidding the amount of its debt claim against the company.  11 U.S.C. § 363(k) 
(authoring credit bidding by secured creditors).  Unless the activist debtholder is also willing to pay cash in 
amount above its debt claim, the company will not have any cash or assets remaining after the sale to pay 
the claims of junior creditors or the interests of equity holders. 
96 See History, DARDEN, http://www.darden.com/about/photo_history.asp (last visited July 20, 2015).  As 
described below, Darden, Inc. was not formed until 1995.  Accordingly, references to Darden before 1995 
are to the business operations ultimately owned by Darden after the 1995 spin-off.  Id.  See also Gen. Mills 
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (April 8, 1996) (“During the fiscal year ended May 28, 1995 the 
company spun off its restaurant operations as a separate, free-standing company, Darden Restaurants, 
Inc.”). 
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Darden’s expansion started with the success of its Red Lobster restaurants in the 
1970s.97   Shortly after, General Mills acquired the restaurant chain and, in 1982, 
introduced The Olive Garden.98  General Mills spun off Darden in 1995, with Darden 
becoming an independent publicly traded company on the New York Stock Exchange.99  
Although Darden is most commonly associated with Red Lobster and Olive Garden, 
Darden has owned (and in many instances continues to own) other well-known niche 
restaurants, including Bahama Breeze, LongHorn Steakhouse, Smokey Bones, The 
Capital Grille, and The Yard House.100   
 
Darden’s first major financial disappointment occurred in 1997, when the company 
recorded an annual loss of $91.03 million and closed fifty-five stores.101  This setback 
was, however, temporary, and Darden was able to remedy most of the problem through 
operational improvements at its Red Lobster and Olive Garden restaurants.102  The 
company then experienced a period of continuous growth and increased profits, with only 
minor interruptions, until late 2007.103  
 
After that time, Darden struggled to meet investors’ and management’s expectations.  
Operational adjustments, such as opening new “combo” locations featuring Red Lobster 
and Olive Garden, did not succeed,104 and expansion plans failed to boost revenues.105  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Red Lobster opened in the late 1960s, but it did not expand significantly in popularity and locations until 
the 1970s.  See Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 16, 1996) (charting the dramatic rise 
of Red Lobster in the 1970s, from six restaurants in 1970 to 260 at the end of fiscal year 1980). 
98 See id.  
99 See Gen. Mills Inc., supra note 96. 
100 Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (March 30, 2015).   
101 Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 15, 1997) (see section “Expansion Strategy” 
noting that in fiscal year 1997, Darden closed 39 Red Lobster restaurants in the U.S. and Canada, and 16 
Olive Garden restaurants in the U.S.). 
102 Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 25, 1998) (see press release discussing 50% 
growth in first quarter earnings and double-digit increases in comparable restaurant sales).  
103 The company acquired and sold various assets during this period in the hopes of increasing cash flows.  
See Rare Hospitality Sold to Orlando Company for $1.4 billion, THE BUSINESS JOURNALS (Aug. 31, 2014, 
7:28 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2007/08/13/daily41.html?page=all (reporting that 
Darden had purchased Rare Hospitality, adding LongHorn Steakhouse and Capital Grille to Darden’s line 
of Restaurants).  See also See Darden Restaurants Offers Barbecue Chain For Sale, Better Positioning 
Casual Dining Leader For Future Growth, Darden (Aug. 31, 2014, 7:32 PM), 
http://investor.darden.com/investors/news-releases/press-release-details/2007/Darden-Restaurants-Offers-
Barbecue-Chain-For-Sale-Better-Positioning-Casual-Dining-Leader-For-Future-Growth/default.aspx 
(reporting that Darden elected to sell its Smokey Bones chain of barbecue restaurants “as part of an overall 
effort by the company to better position Darden for future growth.”).   
104 See Sandra Pedicini, Darden Restaurants tests combo Olive Garden/Red Lobster for smaller markets, 
Orlando Sentinel (August 31, 2014, 7:48 PM), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-01-24/business/os-
hybrid-olive-garden-red-lobster-20110124_1_red-lobster-olive-garden-darden-restaurants (reporting that 
Darden was pairing its two marquee brands in single-building locations in markets that could not support 
separate locations for the two).  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (July 18, 2014).   
105 Darden also attempted to boost sales by adding two seafood chains to its line-up of specialty restaurants 
in 2012. See Alan Snel, Darden Buys Two Seafood Brands, NATION’S RESTAURANT NEWS (August 31, 
2014, 8:00 PM), http://nrn.com/archive/darden-buys-two-seafood-brands (reporting that Darden acquired 
two small seafood chains, Eddie V’s Prime Seafood and Wildfish Seafood Grille, in a $59 million cash 
transaction).  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (July 18, 2014). 
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Darden entered a particularly tumultuous period in late 2012 and 2013.106  Darden 
reported a 37.6% drop in first-quarter profit in 2013 compared with that same period in 
the previous year.107  Although analysts had expected earnings of 70-72 cents per share in 
the first-quarter of 2013, the actual mark was well below that at 53 cents per share.108  
The company’s stock dropped 7% the day the news of the weak earnings and job cuts 
broke and closed at $45.78 per share.109  Notably, although Darden’s bigger name brands 
struggled in the first quarter of 2013, Darden’s specialty group out-performed them, 
showing a 0.5% rise in sales.110  This likely fueled activist investors’ later calls for big-
brand spinoffs. 
 
In December 2013, Darden tried to calm investors’ unrest and calls for change with a 
restructuring plan aimed at increasing shareholder value.111  The major prongs of 
Darden’s plan included spinning off its Red Lobster brand and reducing new unit 
expansion.112  Darden was under continuing pressure from one of its shareholders, 
Barington Capital Group, to spin off its under-performing chains.113  News of the planned 
spin-off and worse-than-expected earnings drove the stock price down by 5% to 
$50.17.114 
 
Shortly after the company’s announcement, another shareholder, Starboard Values 
LP, came out against the Red Lobster spin-off.115  Starboard owned approximately 6.2% 
of Darden’s stock at the time, and it had been lobbying Darden to consider other options, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 For example, on the same day in September 2013 that the company announced weak first-quarter 
earnings, the company also announced that it was cutting 85 jobs at its Orlando headquarters and the 
retirement of its second-in-command, COO Drew Madsen.  See Sandra Pedicini, Darden Restaurants 
reducing 85 corporate positions; COO Drew Madsen leaving, Orlando Sentinel (August 31, 2014, 8:07 
PM), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-09-20/business/os-darden-layoffs-20130920_1_darden-
restaurants-olive-garden-central-florida-restaurant-professor.  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report 
(Form 10-K) 21 (July 18, 2014) (describing and anticipating the economic conditions that could interfere 
with performance); Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Sept. 20, 2013). 
107 Id.  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 20 (Sept. 30, 2013).   
108 See Pedicini, supra note 106.  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 20 (Sept. 30, 
2013).   
109 See Pedicini, supra note 106.   
110 Id.  Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 20, 2013) (see press release on first quarter 
sales from Darden’s specialty restaurants reporting same-restaurant sales increases of 3.2% at The Capital 
Grille, 2.7% at Bahama Breeze and 2.1% at Eddie V’s, offset partially by declines of 4.4% at Seasons 52 
and 1.5% at Yard House). 
111 See Darden Announces Comprehensive Plan to Enhance Shareholder Value, Darden (August 31, 2014, 
8:22 PM), http://investor.darden.com/investors/news-releases/press-release-details/2013/Darden-
Announces-Comprehensive-Plan-to-Enhance-Shareholder-Value/default.aspx.  See also Darden Rests., 
Inc., Event Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Dec. 19, 2013). 
112 See Darden Rests., Inc., Event Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Dec. 19, 2013). 
113  See David Benoit, Darden’s Red Lobster Split Gets Messy Reaction, WSJ Blogs Money Beat 
(August 31, 2014, 8:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/12/19/dardens-red-lobster-split-gets-
messy-reaction/.  Barington also suggested that Darden should spin off Olive Garden.  Id. 
114 Id.   
115 See Samantha Sharf, Activists Turn Up Heat On Darden: Red Lobster Deal ‘Unconscionable,’ Board 
‘Misleading’, FORBES (August 31, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/05/22/activists-
turn-up-heat-on-darden-red-lobster-deal-unconscionable-board-misleading/.  See also Darden Rests., Inc., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14-15 (July 18, 2014). 
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such as splitting off its property as an independent real estate investment trust.116  Darden 
ignored Starboard’s suggestions, even though Barington ultimately supported Starboard’s 
request for a shareholder vote on the proposed spin-off.117 Darden spun off Red Lobster 
without a shareholder meeting or vote.118 Starboard ultimately pursued and won a proxy 
battle to take over Darden’s board by nominating a slate of directors to replace all 12 
members.119  
 
To support its proxy contest, Starboard produced a 249-slide PowerPoint 
presentation that walked shareholders through Darden’s missteps, both financial and 
operational, and offered concrete solutions to improve the company’s performance.120  
For example, one slide, titled “Breadsticks:  just one example of food waste,” explained 
how Olive Garden’s practice of serving its unlimited breadsticks in excessive quantities 
beyond the customers’ requests or needs reduced margins and profitability.121  Another 
slide then suggested the consequences:  “Despite having far more stores than any of its 
peers, Darden does not show economies of scale in food costs.  In fact, Darden’s food 
costs are near the highest in the industry….  We believe that the primary driver of 
Darden’s food cost problem is poor execution and discipline around food waste, portion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Starboard asserted that Darden was selling Red Lobster for just $100 million more than the value of the 
chain’s real estate, which could be sold tax-free.  Darden disagreed with Starboard’s analysis, asserting that 
the proposed sale would generate about $1.6 billion in proceeds.  Darden planned to use $1 billion of the 
proceeds to retire debt and the remainder to fund a share buyback program of as much as $700 million.  See 
Sharf, supra note 115. See also Darden Rests., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Sept. 16, 2014) (see 
exhibit 99.2, a presentation discussing Starboard’s proposal). 
117 See Barington Group Sends Letter To The Independent Directors Of Darden Restaurants, PR Newswire 
(August 31, 2014, 9:03 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/barington-group-sends-letter-to-
the-independent-directors-of-darden-restaurants-252430861.html. 
118 See Darden Completes Sale of Red Lobster to Golden Capital, Seeking Alpha (August 31, 9:20 PM), 
http://seekingalpha.com/pr/10587495-darden-completes-sale-of-red-lobster-to-golden-gate-
capital?source=email_rt_mc_body&app=n.  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Event Report (Form 8-K/A) 
(Aug. 1, 2014).  In the midst of finalizing the sale, Darden announced that Otis was stepping down as 
Chairman and CEO of Darden, either at the end of the year or before if a replacement was found.  See 
Darden Announces Leadership Succession Plan, Seeking Alpha (August 31, 2014, 9:15 PM), 
http://seekingalpha.com/pr/10591835-darden-announces-leadership-succession-
plan?source=email_rt_mc_body&app=n.  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Event Report (Form 8-K) (July 29, 
2014).  This announcement appeared to be a move to try to appease shareholders prior to the annual 
shareholders’ meeting. 
119 See Nick Turner, Darden Activist Investor Starts Board Fight Over Red Lobster, Bloomberg (August 31, 
2014, 8:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-22/darden-investor-starboard-starts-proxy-
battle-over-red-lobster.html.  See also Darden Rests., Inc., Event Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 16, 2014). 
120 Press Release, Starboard Releases Detailed Transformation Plan for Darden Restaurants, Sept. 12, 2014, 
available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/starboard-releases-detailed-transformation-plan-
for-darden-restaurants-274867301.html.  Starboard compiled a similar presentation to contest Darden’s 
decision to sell Red Lobster.  See StarboardValue, INVESTOR PRESENTATION, DARDEN RESTAURANTS, INC., 
Mar. 31, 2014, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/940944/000092189514000699/ex991dfan14a06297125_033114.p
df. 
121  StarboardValue, TRANSFORMING DARDEN RESTAURANTS 104-05, Sept. 11, 2014, available at 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/dri/Library/20140911_Starboard-presentation.pdf. 
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size, and preparation.”122  Starboard ended the slide presentation with a summary of why 
“Darden is compelling,” Starboard’s priorities, and its plan for the company.123  
 
Although Darden reported losses for the second quarter of 2014 (i.e., the first quarter 
following the board’s replacement), it has consistently outperformed since.124  Darden 
reported improved revenue and sales for the third and fourth quarters,125 and was 
identified as one of the “hottest dividend stocks of 2015.”126   
 
D. Case Study:  RadioShack Corp. 
 
Similar to Darden, RadioShack has a long history dating back to 1921, when it 
opened as a small shop in Boston.127  The company initially focused on radios, expanding 
to other audio equipment in the 1950s and then to electronic calculators and computers in 
the 1970s.  RadioShack experienced financial distress early in its lifecycle; in fact, the 
company was on the verge of bankruptcy when Tandy Corp. purchased it in 1963.128  
Tandy was able to turn around the company by branding it as a “hobby store”—a place 
where you could purchase whatever you needed to build the latest gadget.  The strategy 
was successful, and the company grew from 100 stores in 1966 to over 1,000 stores by 
1971.  It also started generating a profit just two years after the Tandy acquisition.129 
 
For most of the 1970s and 1980s, RadioShack was the store for everything 
electronic.  It was able to stay ahead of the curve and capture the market on new 
innovations such as the electronic calculator, the CB radio, the personal computer, and 
the cellular phone.130  RadioShack began to falter, however, in the 1990s, and it never 
really regained its footing.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Id. at 102. 
123 Id. at 286. 
124 Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 31, 2014) (announcing second quarter results). 
125 Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 30, 2015) and Darden Rests., Inc., Current 
Report (Form 8-K) (June 23, 2015) (see press release announcing fourth quarter results attached as exhibit 
99.1). 
126 See Darden Rests.,  Inc., Current Report, supra note 129.  
127  See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Inside RadioShack’s Slow-Motion Collapse, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 2, 2015, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-02-02/inside-
radioshack-s-slow-motion-collapse; RadioShack Corporation—Company Profile, Information, Business 
Description, History, Background Information on RadioShack, REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, available at 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/8/RadioShack-Corporation.html. 
128 See Brustein, supra note 127.  Tandy was a leather company, which was trying to diversify in the 1960s.  
Tandy ultimately exited the leather industry in 1975 and focused on the electronics side of the business.  
Tandy was publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and it changed its name to RadioShack in 
2000, then trading under the symbol RHS.  See generally A Brief History of RadioShack, 
RADIOSHACKCATALOGS.COM, available at http://www.radioshackcatalogs.com/history.html.  See also 
Brustein, supra note 127.   
129  See Brustein, supra note 127; Steven Davidoff Solomon, A History of Misses for RadioShack, 
DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2014, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/for-
radioshack-a-history-of-misses/?_r=0. 
130 See Brustein, supra note 127; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 133. 
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RadioShack’s management tried altering the company’s offerings and business 
model to improve the company’s overall performance.  By the late 1990s, RadioShack 
stopped manufacturing personal computers and cellular phones, and it began opening big-
box type retail stores that each specialized in certain electronic products.131  The concept 
stores experiment failed, and each was shuttered or sold by the end of the 1990s.132  
 
RadioShack’s permanent decline began in 2005, with significant management 
turnover and increasing diminution in value.  From 2005 to 2014, the company 
experienced six changes at the CEO position, and its shares lost almost all of their 
value.133  The company also experienced 11 consecutive quarters of losses before filing 
for bankruptcy in early 2015.134  Notably, RadioShack did not file for bankruptcy 
quietly—it tried vigorously to avoid it.135  The question becomes whether those efforts 
and the prebankruptcy actions of its lenders helped or ultimately hurt the company and its 
shareholders. 
 
As RadioShack struggled to rebrand itself in 2012 and 2013, it secured a financing 
package of $835 million to refinance its existing debt and provide additional liquidity.136  
The facility consisted of a $585 million secured credit facility provided by a group of 
lenders lead by GE Capital and a $250 million term loan provided by Salus Capital 
Partners, LLC and Cerberus Capital Management.137  Both loans contained a number of 
restrictive covenants, including one that limited the number of stores that RadioShack 
could close in any one period.138  This particular covenant would prove problematic. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131  See id. See also Tandy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 30, 1994) (see sections on 
“Discontinued Operations” and “Sale of Joint Venture Interest” discussing divestiture of computer 
manufacturing businesses and cellphone manufacturing business; and see Item 1 discussing various stores). 
132 See Davidoff Solomon, supra note 133. See also Tandy Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 6 (May 
12, 2000) (note 6, 1996 Business Restructuring). 
133 See Brustein, supra note 127; Barry Schlachter, At RadioShack, A History of Hits and Missed Chances, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 4, 2014 (“Sales have dropped 33 percent since 2005, when it recorded net profits of 
$267 million, compared with last year’s loss of $400 million.”), available at 
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/at-radioshack-a-history-of-hits-and-missed-chances/; d’Innocenzio & 
Chapman, supra note 126 (“RadioShack’s stock closed below $1 per share Friday for the first time in its 
history, reflecting investors’ concern over what lies in store for the long-struggling consumer electronics 
chain.”).  
134 See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz & Michael J. de la Merced, RadioShack Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
After a Deal with Sprint, DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/radio-shack-files-for-chapter-11-bankrutpcy/?_r=0. The losses 
also are documented in RadioShack’s public filings for the period beginning in April 2012 and ending with 
the bankruptcy filing.  See, e.g., RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 25, 2012); 
RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (April 24, 2012); RadioShack Corp., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (Feb. Feb. 11, 2015) (announcing filing of Chapter 11). 
135 RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 11, 2014) (see Exhibit No. 99.1, Press Release, 
“RadioShack Reports Second Quarter Financial Results” discussing restructuring efforts). 
136 RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 13, 2013) (announcing financing). 
137 Id. 
138 RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 13, 2013) (see sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement 
between RadioShack and General Electric Capital (exhibit 10.1), and sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement 
between RadioShack and Salus Capital Partners, LLC (exhibit 10.3)). 
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RadioShack’s restructuring plan in 2014 included streamlining its operations and 
closing approximately 1,100 underperforming stores.139  Unfortunately, the term loan 
permitted RadioShack to close only 200 stores per year, with 600 store closings over the 
life of the loan agreement.140  Salus and Cerberus denied RadioShack’s numerous 
requests for a waiver of the restriction without certain fees, terms, and conditions, which 
RadioShack found unacceptable (and expensive).141  As one commentator observed, 
“‘this is also a bit of a game of chicken — if the banks play hardball too much. 
RadioShack may end up being forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which will leave 
the banks fighting over the scraps.’”142 
  
Shortly thereafter, RadioShack began exploring financing and restructuring 
alternatives with one of its shareholders, Standard General, L.P.  Standard General 
provided the following description of these discussions in its September 2015 Schedule 
13D filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
 
Standard General has been in discussions with the Company regarding a 
proposal on a business operating plan and certain ways to improve the 
Company’s liquidity position in advance of the holiday shopping season. 
Proposals under discussion include Standard General and certain other 
investors (the “New Investors”) purchasing loans and other commitments 
under the Company’s asset backed credit facility (the “Credit Facility”) 
from its existing lenders. Under such a proposed transaction, Standard 
General and certain other New Investors may propose to subordinate their 
investment in the Credit Facility to other investors in order to improve the 
near-term liquidity available to fund the Company’s holiday working 
capital needs. Pursuant to such a proposal, the investment by the New 
Investors could be the first step of a broader recapitalization of 
RadioShack proposed to be completed by early 2015, which may include 
Standard General and certain other New Investors acquiring preferred 
equity convertible into common equity, board nomination rights and 
corresponding changes to the Company’s structure….143 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 See, e.g., Elizabeth Harris, RadioShack Pulls Back on Size of Store Closings, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2014, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/business/radioshack-pulls-back-on-size-of-store-
closings.html; Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for an Order, Pursuant to Section 
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule 2004, and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1, Authorizing 
and Directing the Examination of the Debtors and Certain Third Parties, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-
10197, Docket No. 304, at 8 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter “Committee Rule 2004 Motion”].  
140 Id.  
141 See RadioShack Corp., Current Report, filed on form 8-K, dated May 8, 2014.  See also Committee Rule 
2004 Motion, supra note 139, at 12 (“In connection with the October 2014 Transaction, RadioShack 
incurred $31.8 million in financing fees as well as approximately $142 million in additional obligations,
 
despite the fact that the company had suffered losses in the previous 11 quarters.”) (citations omitted). 
142 Id. (quoting Anthony Chukumba, BB&T Capital Markets). 
143 Schedule 13D, filed by Standard General L.P. on September 26, 2014. 
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Standard General’s Schedule 13D also revealed that it owned 9.8% of RadioShack’s 
common stock, with related entities owning additional shares and with it having options 
to purchase 3 million additional shares.144 
 
Standard General and a group of investors purchased RadioShack’s $535 million 
credit facility from GE Capital and immediately amended the facility to provide the 
company with additional liquidity.145  The investors also entered into a Recapitalization 
and Investment Agreement, under which the investors would convert their debt into a 
substantial percentage of RadioShack’s equity if certain conditions were met.146  This 
additional liquidity infusion allowed RadioShack to operate through the 2014 winter 
holiday season, but it did not solve RadioShack’s underlying operational and financial 
problems.  RadioShack also failed to satisfy the conditions of the Recapitalization and 
Investment Agreement.147 
 
Accordingly, RadioShack filed for bankruptcy in February 2015.148  The bankruptcy 
filing was premised on a prenegotiated sale of the entire company to Standard General 
and other investors through a credit bid of the prebankruptcy debt held by those 
investors.149 The bankruptcy case took several different twists and turns, but Standard 
General ultimately was the successful bidder for substantially all of RadioShack’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Id. 
145 See Press Release, RadioShack Corporation, RadioShack Announces Milestone in Recapitalization 
Process, Oct. 3, 2014, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/radioshack-announces-
milestone-in-recapitalization-process-278065871.html.  See also RadioShack Corporation, Form 8-K, 
Current Report, Oct. 6, 2014 (describing purchase of credit facility and amendments to that facility), 
available at http://secfilings.nyse.com/filing.php?doc=1&attach=ON&ipage=9837356&rid=23.  Notably, 
the loans were purchased by General Retail Holdings L.P. (“GRH”) and General Retail Funding LLC 
(“GRF”), each an affiliate of Standard General.  Moreover, other investors were partners or members of 
GRH and GRF.  See Declaration of Carlin Adrianopoli in Support of First Day Pleadings, In re RadioShack 
Corp., Case No. 15-10197, Docket No. 17, at 7 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5. 2015) (explaining factors that 
contributed to RadioShack’s bankruptcy and its failure to meet the conditions of the Recapitalization and 
Investment Agreement) [hereinafter “Adrianopoli Declaration”]. 
146 See RadioShack Corporation, Form S-3 Registration Statement, Dec. 12, 2014 (describing terms of the 
rights offering to RadioShack’s “legacy shareholders” [i.e., existing shareholders other than the investor 
group] and the issuance of convertible preferred stock to Standard General and others in the investor group 
that would be convertible into 20-50% of the company’s common stock in exchange for debt cancellation if 
certain conditions were met), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/96289/000119312514441276/d836621ds3.htm.  
147 See Adrianopoli Declaration, supra note 145, at 14. 
148 Id. 
149 See Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders:  (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale Procedures; 
(II) Approving the Sale of Assets; and (III) Granting Related Relief, In re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-
10197, Docket No. 36 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015).  “General Wireless [i.e., Standard General] was the 
stalking-horse bidder for the stores with a bid valued at $145.5 million, comprised of $117.5 million in the 
form of a credit bid of the credit agreement loans, $18.6 million in cash, and $9.4 million in assumed 
liabilities.”  See Alan Zimmerman, RadioShack Asset Sale to Standard General Nets Court OK, FORBES, 
Mar. 31, 2015, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2015/03/31/bankruptcy-radioshack-
asset-sale-to-standard-general-nets-court-ok/.  Standard General’s credit bid was reduced to approximately 
$112 million based on a dispute with RadioShack’s other prepetition lender, Salus.  Id.  For an example of 
the various allegations asserted against Standard General and others involved in RadioShack’s 
prebankruptcy restructuring efforts, see Committee Rule 2004 Motion, supra note 133.   
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assets.150  The sale generated little value for the majority of the company’s prebankruptcy 
creditors and shareholders.151  For purposes of this article, it is important to note that 
although some of the company’s stores continue to operate in a modified form under the 
new ownership,152 Standard General was the primary beneficiary of the sale.  The 
corporate entity was not restructured in any meaningful way that benefited its long-term 
sustainability or the interests of its prebankruptcy shareholders, creditors, employees, and 
other stakeholders. 
E. Takeaways from the Case Studies 
 
The Darden and RadioShack case studies illustrate two very different approaches to 
activism.  Some commentators may find both approaches troublesome, and some may 
view them as equally valuable.  Undeniably, both activists were pursuing strategies that 
each believed to be in their own respective best interests; acknowledging the self-interest 
and general motivation to increase the investor’s own return on investment, which are 
present in all activism, facilitates a more meaningful analysis. 
 
Starboard approached Darden as an owner, offering critiques of management and 
operations that it believed were depressing the company’s overall value.153  Starboard not 
only criticized, but it also offered potential management and operational solutions.  It 
disseminated its analysis and additional information to all of the company’s shareholders.  
Starboard did not extract any fees or value that would not also be received proportionally 
by all of the company’s shareholders.  Although Starboard’s slate of directors now runs 
the company, those directors were vetted with and voted on by Starboard’s 
shareholders.154  The company also is continuing to operate on a much stronger platform, 
with improved performance and likely returns to shareholders.155   
 
Standard General, on the other hand, first approached RadioShack as a shareholder, 
but with a plan to own the company’s debt—indeed, a secured position at the most senior 
level of the company’s debt structure.156  Standard General does not appear to have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 See Order Authorizing (I) the Sale of Certain Assets of the Debtors Free and Clear of All Claims, Liens, 
Liabilities, Rights, Interests and Encumbrances; (II) the Debtors to Enter Into and Perform Their 
Obligations Under the Asset Purchase Agreement and Certain Ancillary Agreements; (III) the Debtors to 
Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (IV) Granting Related Relief, 
In re RadioShack Corp., Case No. 15-10197, Docket No. 1672 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 1, 2015).  See also 
Zimmerman, supra note 149 (explaining, among other things, that Standard General’s winning bid also 
included an agreement with Sprint for a small cash infusion and a commitment to a “store within a store” 
concept going forward). 
151 See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 149 (“Despite all the [turmoil] associated with the competition for the 
RadioShack assets, at the end of the day it would appear to mean little for the company’s creditors, most of 
whom were destined to see a minimal, if any, recovery regardless of who was declared the winner.”). 
152 At the time of its bankruptcy filing, RadioShack had 4,100 company-operated stores, 1,100 dealer-
franchised outlets, and 21,000 full- and part-time employees.  See Adrianopoli Declaration, supra note 149, 
at 4-6.  Reports indicate that Standard General will maintain approximately 1,723 of those operating 
locations.  See Zimmerman, supra note 149. 
153 See supra Part II.C. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See supra Part II.D. 
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offered any operational or restructuring expertise to the company, and it did not facilitate 
the dissemination of information to other shareholders.  Rather, Standard General appears 
to have situated itself in a position in which it would win regardless of whether the 
company restructured or not.  In addition, at least based on allegations in the bankruptcy 
case, some investors participating in Standard General’s prebankruptcy extension of 
credit to the company also sold credit default swaps on RadioShack that would have 
become payable if RadioShack defaulted prior to January 2015.157  Consequently, 
Standard General held multiple positions throughout RadioShack’s capital structure and 
was focused more on capturing returns—arguably to the exclusion of all others—through 
a takeover of the company as opposed to an operational or financial restructuring.  
 
Notably, each of the above investment strategies is well known and used by various 
entities in the industry.158  This article does not challenge the validity or propriety of 
either strategy.  The article does suggest, however, that one form of activism may hold 
greater value for the corporate entity itself and more of the corporation’s stakeholders.  
The challenge is identifying means to encourage a more Darden-like approach to 
distressed companies, recognizing that not all such efforts will prove successful and that 
all activism has the potential to reallocate value against the interests of a majority of the 
company’s stakeholders.  The following section considers the various alternative activist 
strategies and draws on the case studies to develop and propose the targeted proxy access 
bylaw—a tool that would utilize the discipline and expertise often present in activism and 
enhance value for the corporate entity and more of its stakeholders. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION:  PROXY ACCESS WHEN A COMPANY NEEDS IT MOST 
 
Conventional wisdom posits that debt disciplines management.159  Debt financing 
subjects management to, among other things, conduct covenants, financial and 
performance metrics, and active oversight by lenders.  In theory, such provisions should 
encourage responsible management and reduce agency costs.  In reality, debt financing 
can cause management to take excessive risks, limit the company’s future operational and 
restructuring alternatives, and make the company vulnerable to takeover bids by 
distressed debt investors.160  Accordingly, conventional wisdom may not hold true in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Id. 
158 See supra Parts II.A, B.  In addition, a Darden-like approach is not always successful.  See, e.g., Svea 
Herbst-Bayless, Ackman Turns Back on J.C. Penney, Sells Entire Stake in Retailer, REUTERS, Aug. 27, 
2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/27/us-jcpenney-ackman-
idUSBRE97P0TA20130827; William Alden et al., The Activist Investor Scorecard, DEALBOOK, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/11/business/dealbook/the-
activist-investors-of-wall-street.html. 
159 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy:  Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, 
AND TARGET:  THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314, 321-23 (John C. Coffee, Jr., et al. eds. 1988) 
(describing attributes of debt that discipline management). 
160 As a company incurs more debt to try to prolong its life and fix the financial or operational problems, 
directors may be more aggressive on the premise that the company and shareholders have nothing to lose.  
Such conduct, however, can damage any remaining value at the company.  See, e.g., Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d. Cir. 2001) (explaining dilemma faced by 
directors of distressed companies and basis for theory of deepening insolvency).  See also U.S. Bank Nat. 
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every case.  A company approaching or facing financial distress may need an appropriate 
dose of shareholder activism to discipline management and preserve value.  
 
That said, not every kind of shareholder activism is value enhancing.161  The 
activism needs to fit the problem.  In the context of financial distress, the tool should 
encourage management to acknowledge the company’s issues in a timely manner, 
explore all options, and be open to new approaches and perspectives.  It also should strive 
to enhance management’s leverage in negotiations with creditors and other stakeholders.  
All too often, management of a financially distressed company has waited too long to 
address the issues underlying the company’s distress, has borrowed more money to buy 
additional time, and, as a result, ends up negotiating the end deal with lenders with little 
or no bargaining power.162  As explained below, the targeted proxy access bylaw is 
designed to incentivize management to proactively manage operational and financial 
distress and to provide shareholders with access to the ballot when management fails in 
those efforts.  
 
This Part provides a brief history of proxy access rules and regulations, and discusses 
the current state of proxy access initiatives.  It explores the basic parameters of proxy 
access proposals and reviews the ongoing debate concerning the utility of proxy access.  
It then explains the targeted proxy access proposal in greater detail, identifying key 
elements of such a bylaw, proposed language, and potential implementation issues.  It 
concludes by suggesting the tailored nature of the targeted proxy access proposal better 
addresses potential governance inefficiencies than more general proxy access initiatives. 
 
A. An Overview of Proxy Access  
 
The Darden case study illustrates how activist shareholders can use a proxy contest 
to effect change.163  The typical proxy contest involves an activist shareholder, who likely 
owns more than five percent of the company’s stock and has made required disclosures 
under section 13D of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”).164  The 
activist shareholder will initiate (or continue) conversations with management to glean 
knowledge and begin outreach to other shareholders on an informal basis.165  The activist 
shareholder is careful not to trip the solicitation rules of the Exchange Act until it is ready 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ass’n v. Stanley, 297 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tx. App. 2009) (creditor brought action arguing that board 
approved excessive spending and citing expect report opining that “that despite numerous ‘red flags,’ the 
directors ‘were in total support of the business strategy of “swinging for the fences” in order to try to pay 
off the Senior Preferred Stock and return control of [TransTexas] to Stanley’”). 
161 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
162 See id.  See also supra Part II.B.  
163 See supra Part II.C. 
164 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (codifying section 13D of the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240-13d.  The rules 
also require a shareholder who files a Schedule 13D to update the filing as the shareholder’s holdings and 
objectives change. 
165 For an example of the start of a typical activist campaign, see David Benoit and Jacob Bunge, Nelson 
Peltz Launches Proxy Fight Against DuPont, WALL ST. J.,, Jan. 8, 2015. 
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to begin filing materials with the SEC.166 Solicitations may begin prior to the filing of the 
proxy statement, but the activist shareholder must file any written materials used in the 
solicitation with the SEC. 167  These additional solicitation materials may contain 
significantly more information than the proxy statement, as disagreements between the 
company and the activist shareholder often play out more visibly in “fight letters” and 
other communications with shareholders that, under the rules, are filed with, but not pre-
cleared by, the SEC.168 
 
An activist shareholder pursuing a proxy contest may put forth a full or partial slate 
of directors to challenge the company’s proposed slate.169  The activist shareholder’s 
proxy materials and proxy card are sent separately from that of the company.  In the 
typical proxy contest, each side bears its own costs, and the contest can be quite 
expensive.170  DuPont Chemical reportedly spent $15 million to defeat a proxy contest 
launched by an activist shareholder, Trian Fund Management.171  Although some data 
suggest that proxy contests create value regardless of the outcome, proxy contests are rare 
and may not facilitate a change in the board.172  
 
Not only are proxy contests expensive, they also are often quite ugly.173  A proxy 
contest is by definition adversarial.  The company’s directors do not want the activist 
shareholder’s nominee(s) on the board, and they likely disagree with the facts and 
arguments asserted by the activist shareholder to support the proxy contest.  There are no 
pre-determined grounds for a valid or useful proxy contest.  The activist shareholder’s 
objectives may be bona fide and in the best interests of the company; they also may be 
purely self-motivated and based on agenda adverse to other stakeholders.174  Regardless 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 See 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-1-3 (defining solicitation and establishing general solicitation rules); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240-14a-6 (setting forth the filing and pre-clearance process for proxy statements).  
167 See 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-12 (allowing certain kinds of solicitations prior to the filing of the proxy 
statement). 
168 See John C. Wilcox, Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors:  Unintended Consequences and 
the Case for the Reform of the U.S. Proxy System, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT 
(Lucian Bebchuk ed. 2005) (explaining tools often used by activist shareholders in intense proxy contests). 
169 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-4 (setting forth proxy requirements). 
170 See Michael J. Goldberg, Democracy in the Private Sector:  The Rights of Shareholders and Union 
Members, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 393, 409 (2015) (“The high cost of proxy fights have made them rare, and 
this is exacerbated by free rider problems, and rational apathy on the part of shareholders with easy exit 
available through the Wall Street Rule.”). 
171 See Jeff Mordock, DuPont Spent $15M to Keep Activist Off Board, USA TODAY, May 19, 2015. 
172 See DONALD DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES 84 
(2013) (“Despite a low success rate, proxy fights often result in positive abnormal returns to target 
shareholders regardless of the outcome.”) (citing studies).  See also Christopher Takeshi Napier, 
Resurrecting Rule 14a-11:  A Renewed Call for Federal Proxy Access Reform, Justifications and 
Suggestions, 67 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 843, 867-869 (2015) (reviewing studies assessing value of shareholder 
contests and suggesting more recent studies indicate value creation). 
173 The public opinion campaign that often accompanies a proxy battle can reach far and wide.  See, e.g., 
Stephen Gandel, DuPont Activist Battle Spreads from Wall Street to Academia, FORTUNE.COM, Apr. 21, 
2015 (describing the public exchanges and accusations between the activist shareholder engaged in a proxy 
fight with DuPont and a Yale University professor).  
174 See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, *7-*10 (May 2, 2014) (in the contest of a 
challenged shareholder rights plan, the court reviews exchanges between the company’s Chair, President, 
and CEO, William Ruprecht, and the activist investor, Third Point; the court quotes Ruprecht as saying, 
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of the objective, the fight that ensues can be very disruptive for the company and its 
ongoing operations and should not be undertaken lightly. 
 
Proxy access, which generally allows qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain 
percentage of the board through the company’s proxy materials, does not eliminate the 
adversarial nature of the process.  The simple act of a shareholder putting forth its own 
nominee suggests a lack of confidence in the current board and directly challenges the 
board’s management of the company.  In most cases, the board likely will oppose the 
shareholder nominees, and that effort still requires time and money that otherwise could 
be devoted to the company’s operations.  Nevertheless, proxy access can cabin the 
dispute and mitigate some of the costs associated with a proxy contest.   
 
Proxy access initiatives are not new,175 but they garnered increased attention after 
Congress passed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd Frank Act”).176  The Dodd Frank Act authorized the SEC to adopt proxy access 
rules,177 and the SEC was quick to pass a rule—Rule 14a-11—that required public 
companies to include shareholder nominees in their proxy materials.178  The legislation 
and the resulting rule were grounded in general concerns regarding the lack of board 
accountability during the 2008 financial crisis and a belief by some that proxy access 
could mitigate that problem. 179  Rule 14a-11 was short-lived, however, as it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“The motivation for that [proxy] fight is only peripherally about returning capital.  It is about being on 
Sotheby’s Board.  Mick McGuire needs that as validation, and Loeb wants that for ego.”); Joe Nocera, 
Investor Exits and Leaves Puzzlement, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2009 (noting that activist investor, William 
Ackman, “said that he had begun the proxy fight [at Target] not because he had a $1 billion-plus 
investment in Target shares that was seriously underwater—not at all!—but because ‘we never want Target 
to be referred to as a “once-great company’”). 
175 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 465, 499-500 
(2012) (describing history of proxy access); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 15 (“The ability of shareholders 
to place director nominees on the company’s proxy materials is an issue that the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has been considering for over sixty years.”). 
176 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 123 Stat. 1376 (2010).  There is a rich literature on proxy access generally, 
including under the Dodd Frank Act and the SEC’s proposed Rule 14a-11.  See, e.g., Joseph Grundfest, 
Advice and Consent:  An Alternative Mechanism for Shareholder Participation in the Nomination and 
Election of Corporate Directors, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk, 
ed. 2004); Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal (November 14, 
2003), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.470121; 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Designing a Shareholder Access Rule, 12 CORP. GOV. ADVISOR 28 (2004); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, The Business Roundtable’s Untenable Case Against Shareholder Access, 55 CASE WESTERN L. 
REV. 557 (2005); Brett McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
A67 (2011); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and 
Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012).  See also supra notes 15 and 16. 
177 See id. at 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)) (authorizing the SEC to adopt rules that, 
among other things, include “a requirement that a solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization by (or on 
behalf of) an issuer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of directors of the 
issuer”). 
178 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-11, invalidated by Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
179 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:  Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1795-97 (2011) (discussing factors leading to passage of certain federal legislation, 
including the Dodd-Frank Act); Rachelle Younglai, Shareholders Win More Rights to Influence Boards, 
REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2010 (describing justifications for and arguments against Rule 14a-11 and quoting SEC 
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successfully challenged in court.180  The SEC has not taken any further action on a 
definitive proxy access rule.   
 
In connection with Rule 14a-11, the SEC also passed an amendment to Rule 14a-
8 that authorized the use of shareholder proposals to initiate changes to the board 
nomination process.  As the SEC explained, “[W]e are amending Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to 
preclude companies from relying on Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to exclude from their proxy 
materials shareholder proposals by qualifying shareholders that seek to establish a 
procedure under a company’s governing documents for the inclusion of one or more 
shareholder director nominees in the company’s proxy materials.” 181   Under the 
shareholder proposal rules, a company must include the shareholder proposal in its proxy 
materials unless the company has grounds to exclude it under the rules.182  Shareholders 
then vote on any shareholder proposals included in the company’s proxy materials at the 
annual meeting. 
 
Shareholders were slow to embrace the shareholder proposal alternative for gaining 
access to the company’s proxy materials.183  They are, however, using it more frequently, 
with varying degrees of success.  The most common proxy access bylaw:  (i) requires a 
shareholder to own a certain percentage of stock (i.e., three percent); (ii) requires the 
shareholder to have owned the stock for a continuous period of time (e.g., three years); 
(iii) limits the number of nominees that a shareholder may submit (e.g., twenty percent of 
the board); and (iv) may limit the number of shareholders that can act collectively as a 
group.184   
 
Companies have responded in different ways to shareholder proposals concerning 
proxy access.  Some have opposed the proposal; some have supported the proposal or 
reached a settlement with the shareholder; and some have tried to pre-empt the 
shareholder proposal by adopting a board-proposed proxy access bylaw.185  Regardless of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chair Mary Schapiro, “As a matter of fairness and accountability, long-term significant shareholders should 
have a means of nominating candidates to the boards that they own.”).   
180 See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1144. 
181 SEC RELEASE NOS. 33-9136, 34-62764, supra note 17, at 35. 
182 Companies have tried to exclude proxy access proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(9) (direct conflict; SEC 
took no position on this exclusion during 2015 proxy season), Rule 14a-8(i)(10) (substantial 
implementation), and Rule 14a-8(i)(11) (duplication), as well as Rules 14a-8(i)(7) (ordinary business) and 
14a-8(i)(3) (contrary to rule), with varying degrees of success.  See, e.g., Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing exclusions under Rules 14a-8(i)(7) and 14a-8(i)(3); 
SIMPSON THATCHER, supra note 8 (reviewing grounds for excluding proxy access proposals); Elizabeth A. 
Ising and Kelsey L. Robinson, Recent Developments Related to the SEC’s Shareholder Proposal Rule, 
2015 BUS. L. TODAY 1 (discussing exclusion of proxy access proposals and Third Circuit’s Wal-Mart 
decision). 
183 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  For examples of the literature supporting proxy access, see 
supra note 15. 
184 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
185 For example, during the 2015 proxy season, 78 companies included a shareholder proposal on proxy 
access with an opposition statement; 16 companies voluntary adopted proxy access; six companies 
negotiated resolutions; seven companies included both a shareholder and a company proposal; two 
companies supported the shareholder proposal; and one company provided no board recommendation.  See 
SIMPSON THATCHER, supra note 8, at 14-15. 
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approach, many companies appear concerned by, and skeptical of, proxy access 
bylaws.186 
 
B. The Targeted Proxy Access Proposal 
 
The current approach to proxy access is an all-or-nothing proposition. 187  
Shareholders either have the ability to nominate directors in the company’s proxy 
materials or they do not.  But such an approach misses a valuable opportunity to tailor 
proxy access proposals to situations that objectively could benefit the company and strike 
a more appropriate balance between management autonomy and accountability. 
 
A targeted proxy access bylaw would allow the board to manage the company, free 
of challenges through proxy access, so long as management of the company was well in 
hand.  The board of a company that is profitable and stable—even if some shareholders 
believed the company could be doing even better—would not face a challenge through 
proxy access.188  Notably, activist shareholders could still launch campaigns against 
management, but they would not have the benefit of the company’s proxy materials.189  
To that end, a targeted proxy access bylaw may deter some campaigns prior to the 
targeted proxy access trigger.  It also may color shareholders’ perspectives of activist 
campaigns launched prior to a triggering event:  Are such efforts for the primary benefit 
of the activist, or the company and larger shareholder body? 
 
A targeted proxy access bylaw also could have a prophylactic effect by encouraging 
executives to manage difficult operational and financial situations more proactively.190  
Although management never intends to make decisions that worsen the company’s 
performance or deepen the company’s financial distress, directors and managers often are 
overly optimistic about their decisionmaking skills and will take that chance.191  Directors 
and managers may, however, consider a broader range of options to mitigate potential 
distress knowing the consequences if they are too slow or too limited in their approach.  
Likewise, to the extent management tries and fails, the targeted proxy access bylaw 
would introduce a new perspective and arguably change the tenor of the discussions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 For an example of the literature opposing or raising concerns with proxy access, see supra note 16. 
187 As noted in Part I and discussed further below, the SEC proposed contingent proxy access in 2003.  The 
target access proposal discussed in this article, however, differs in significant ways from the prior SEC 
proposal.  See infra note 17 and accompanying text.  See also SEC RELEASE NOS. 33-9136, 34-62764, 
supra note 17, at 46-47. 
188 This approach mitigates concerns regarding conflicting interests among a diverse and very dispersed 
shareholder body, as well as potential short-term objectives of the activist investor.  See supra notes 79-80 
and accompanying text. 
189 For example, activist shareholders may launch a proxy campaign to encourage boards to distribute value 
to shareholders though dividends or share buy-back plans.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
190 In this respect, targeted proxy access is a form of “offensive” activism.  See, e.g., Paul Rose & Bernard 
S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1015 (2014) (discussing potential value to offensive activism, including in the context of proxy 
access); Cheffins & Armour, supra note 68, at 58 (distinguishing between offensive and defensive forms of 
shareholder activism). 
191 For a discussion of cognitive biases impacting board decisions, see supra Part I.B. 
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earlier in the process. Shareholders no longer would have to wait or launch expensive 
standalone proxy contests to help management implement a turnaround plan.  The 
triggers, if appropriately crafted, would allow more timely intervention.192 
 
The terms of the targeted proxy access bylaw are key to its effectiveness.  A board or 
shareholder proposing such a bylaw needs to consider not only the factors identified 
above in the context of a more general proxy access bylaw, but also the triggers that 
would grant the targeted proxy access to shareholders.193  Although each company should 
tailor its bylaw to its particular situation and industry, a proponent of the bylaw should 
consider the following:   
 
• Triggers.  Use triggers that are objective and easy to identify.  Triggers could 
include a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a restructuring, 
refinancing, or forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit facility or 
bond issuance; a downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or a certain 
number of consecutive quarters of significant losses (or misses on other 
significant financial metrics).  The concepts of “material definitive agreement” 
and “direct financial obligation” under the SEC’s Form 8-K, Current Report, 
could guide the kinds of agreements subject to the triggers.194  A disclosure 
required by Form 8-K, Item 2.04, Triggering Events that Accelerate or Increase a 
Direct Financial Obligation, could also serve as a trigger.195  In the case of 
RadioShack, the company experienced a loss of $139 million, suspended dividend 
payments to shareholders, and was downgraded by the ratings agencies in 2012-
2013.196  Any one or all of these events could have triggered a targeted proxy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 As discussed supra Part I.B, a board may have “ostrich syndrome” with respect to the company’s 
financial or operational distress.  A board that ignores or delays addressing the company’s financial or 
operational issues potentially impairs the company’s ability to restructure effectively and subjects the 
company to significant outside influence from debtholders.  See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
193 For examples of general proxy access bylaws, see Amended and Restated Bylaws of General Electric, 
dated February 6, 2015, at 7-11, available at http://www.ge.com/sites/default/files/GE_by_laws.pdf; 
Amended and Restated Bylaws of Whole Foods Market, Inc., dated June 26, 2015, at 12-19, available at 
http://assets.wholefoodsmarket.com/www/company-info/investor-relations/corporate-
governance/20150630-Whole-Foods-Market-Inc-Amended-and-Restated-Bylaws_6_26_2015.pdf. 
194 See Form 8-K, Current Report, 17 C.F.R. § 249-308.  The SEC’s release concerning the 2004 
amendments to Form 8-K explains that, in Item 101, the term “material definitive agreements” has the 
meaning used in Item 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K.  See RELEASE NOS. 33-8400, 34-49424, ADDITIONAL 
FORM 8-K DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND ACCELERATION OF FILING DATE, FINAL RULE, SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Aug. 23, 2004, Section 1 - Registrant's Business and Operations [“SEC 
RELEASE NOS. 33-8400, 34-49424”].  Item 601(b)(10) includes “[e]very contract not made in the ordinary 
course of business which is material to the registrant and is to be performed in whole or in part at or after 
the filing of the registration statement or report or was entered into not more than two years before such 
filing,” as well as certain significant contracts “as ordinarily accompanies the kind of business conducted 
by the registrant.”  17 C.F.R. § 229-601.  Moreover, the SEC’s 2004 release also explained that Item 203 
“requires disclosure of the following information if the company becomes obligated under a direct financial 
obligation that is material to the company.”  RELEASE NOS. 33-8400, 34-49424, supra, at Section 2 - 
Financial Information.  These terms are further explained in the Instructions included in Form 8-K.  See 
Form 8-K, Current Report, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-K.pdf. 
195 See RELEASE NOS. 33-8400, 34-49424, supra note 194, at Section 2 - Financial Information.   
196 See Drew Fitzgerald et al., RadioShack Gets Loan from GE Capital, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 21, 
2013, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303902404579149800844793012. 
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access bylaw.  In that instance, one or more shareholder nominees could have 
been seated prior to the company signing its subsequent financing agreements.  
The triggers should be designed to give the existing a board an opportunity to fix 
an identified problem, but not prolong and thereby exacerbate the problem.  A 
board proposed bylaw would allow the board to establish reasonable parameters 
while recognizing some accountability if it fails.  For example, a target proxy 
bylaw could provide: 
 
Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company shall include 
in its proxy statement for any [subsequent annual] 197  meeting of 
shareholders, the name of any person timely198 nominated for election 
(each a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the Board of Directors by an 
individual Eligible Shareholder or a group of up to [20] Eligible 
Shareholders.  The Company also shall include the Required 
Information199 in any such proxy statement containing the names of 
any Shareholder Nominee. 
 
The term “Trigger Event” means (i) a material default or event of 
default under the Company’s credit agreements, bond indentures, or 
other material financing agreements [or could use “material 
definitive agreements”] that is not cured within the grace period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 This language is bracketed for two reasons.  First, companies and shareholders could specifically define 
the duration of proxy access.  For example, the bylaw could provide that “Upon the occurrence of a Trigger 
Event, the Company shall include in its proxy statement for the immediate four annual meetings….”  Such 
a durational restriction would “reload” the proxy access after the expiration of the trigger on the theory that 
the board used the more direct shareholder intervention for a period of time to assist the turnaround and 
then continues unless and until another triggering event.  Second, timing matters in distressed situations.  
Depending on the kinds of triggers, the bylaw could contemplate a special meeting of shareholders within, 
for example, 90 days of the trigger event to facilitate more timely intervention.  Trigger events designed to 
identify distress as early as possible may not need such accelerated proxy access.  
198 The timeliness of the submission is important.  Many proxy access proposals use a timeframe similar to 
advance notice bylaws, i.e., “not more than one hundred fifty (150) calendar days and not less than one 
hundred twenty (120) calendar days prior to the anniversary date of the date (as specified in the 
Corporation’s proxy materials for its immediately preceding annual meeting of shareholders) on which the 
Corporation first mailed its proxy materials for its immediately preceding annual meeting of shareholders.”  
Amended and Restated Bylaws of Whole Foods Market, Inc., supra note 193, at 13. 
199 The term “Required Information” should include the Shareholder Information, Nominee Information, 
and Shareholder Position Statement described below.  The following is an example of a definition for 
Required Information: 
“Required Information” that the Corporation will include in its proxy statement is the 
information provided to the Secretary concerning the Shareholder Nominee(s) and the Eligible 
Shareholder that is required to be disclosed in the Corporation’s proxy statement by Section 14 
of the Exchange Act, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and, if the Eligible 
Shareholder so elects, a written statement, not to exceed 500 words, in support of the 
Shareholder Nominee(s)’ candidacy (the “Statement”). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in this Article II, Section 15, the Corporation may omit from its proxy materials any 
information or Statement (or portion thereof) that it, in good faith, believes would violate any 
applicable law or regulation…. 
Amended and Restated Bylaws of Whole Foods Market, Inc., supra note 193, at 13. 
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provided by the applicable agreement;200 (ii) the Company’s entry 
into a refinancing agreement, restructuring agreement, forbearance 
agreement, or similar agreement to avoid or resolve a material 
default or event of default under the Company’s credit agreements, 
bond indentures, or other material financing agreements [or could 
use “material definitive agreements”]; (iii) a downgrade of the 
Company’s debt obligations of two or more ratings within a 
consecutive twelve month period by one of the major ratings 
agencies; or (iv) the Company sustaining net losses, as reflected on 
its income statement, for four or more consecutive quarters.201 
 
• Shareholder Eligibility.  Include percentage ownership and holding period 
requirements that align the interests of the shareholder nominating directors with 
the company; limit the number of nominees that may be submitted by 
shareholders and included in the company’s proxy materials; and permit, with 
reasonable limits, participation by groups to allow a more diverse representation 
of shareholders to participate.  These requirements are very similar to the basic 
provisions included in general proxy access bylaws.202 
 
• Shareholder Disclosures.  Require detailed disclosures by the shareholder 
nominating directors.  These disclosures should include not only information 
about its beneficial holdings in the company, but also any related derivative 
products, debt, or other interests it may hold, directly or indirectly, in the 
company.  To supplement the disclosures required in Schedule 14N,203 companies 
and the SEC may want to consider a definition of “economic interest” similar to 
the following definition of “disposable economic interest” under Rule 2019 of the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure:  “any claim, interest, pledge, lien, option, 
participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or derivative right granting 
the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value, acquisition, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 A board and shareholders should identify triggers that work best for the company’s business and capital 
structure and provide sufficient early warnings to allow meaningful intervention in the company’s 
turnaround.  Simply referencing the term “material definitive agreement” may cover all necessary 
agreements.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
201 A board and shareholders may want to use additional or alternative triggers.  Such triggers could focus 
on Items 2.03 and 2.04 of Form 8-K, or even the company receiving a going concern qualification from its 
auditors.  A company likely would not want to rely solely on the going concern qualification because, 
depending on the industry and the nature of the company’s operations, such trigger may or may not provide 
sufficient early warnings of the company’s distress. 
202 See supra notes 184, 193 and accompanying text. 
203 See also 17 C.F.R. § 240-14n-101.  Schedule 14N and many proxy access bylaws focus on disclosures 
concerning the nominating shareholder’s ownership in securities entitled to vote, and whether any such 
securities have been loaned or are subject to a short sale.  Although this information is helpful, it does not 
necessarily provide the complete picture of the nominating shareholder’s interest in the election.  For 
thoughtful articles regarding the issues posed by conflicting and undisclosed ownership positions, see 
Roberta S. Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk—How Should Proxy Reform Address the 
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 93 (2010); Usha Rodrigues, 
Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 
(2011).  
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disposition of a claim or interest.”204  Understanding the economic interests of the 
nominating shareholder and its potential agenda are particularly important in the 
distressed context, as evidenced by the RadioShack case study.205  
 
• Nominee Disclosures.  Require specific disclosures concerning the nominee, 
including all relevant information that is provided by the company with respect to 
its nominees. 206   Notably, the trigger allowing proxy access may help 
shareholders identify nominees offering skills relevant to the particular issues 
plaguing the company. 
 
• Shareholder Position Statement.  Define the scope (and word count) of the 
statement in support that the nominating shareholder may include in the proxy 
materials.207  This may be one of the trickier aspects of a targeted or general proxy 
access proposal because the information should explain why the shareholder 
believes a new approach is necessary.  Disseminating this competing perspective 
is important and valuable in the distressed context.  Nevertheless, it may also be 
unpalatable to the board.  A company should permit statements—even those 
adverse to, or critical of, management—provided they are grounded in facts 
supported by public documents and do not otherwise violate applicable law.208   
 
The Darden case study illustrates the importance of both timely intervention and the 
dissemination of information to all shareholders.209  Notably, companies and shareholders 
can benefit from these attributes of proxy access whether the company proposes a 
targeted proxy access bylaw or already has adopted a more general proxy access bylaw.  
Strategic and thoughtful use of proxy access—only when and as necessary—is an 
important consideration in assessing the value of shareholder intervention.  The factors 
identified in this section with respect to targeted proxy access also can and should guide 
shareholders in using general proxy access to help companies in operational or financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019.  The author is the Assistant Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, but she was not serving in such capacity when Federal Rule 2019 was 
amended to include the definition of disposable economic interest in 2011.  See also Harner, supra note 63 
(suggesting that the SEC amend Schedule 13D and the related rules to require disclosure of information 
concerning debt, as well as, equity securities). 
205 See supra Part III.D. 
206 See also 17 C.F.R. § 240-14n-101. 
207 Many proxy access bylaws limit nominating shareholder statements to 500 words.  See, e.g., Amended 
and Restated Bylaws of General Electric, supra note 193, at 9; Amended and Restated Bylaws of Whole 
Foods Market, Inc., supra note 193, at 14. 
208 For example, General Electric’s proxy access bylaw provides: 
The Eligible Shareholder may provide to the Secretary, within the time period specified in 
Article VII Section D for providing notice of a nomination, a written statement for inclusion in 
the Company’s proxy statement for the meeting, not to exceed 500 words, in support of the 
Shareholder Nominee’s candidacy (the Statement). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in this Article VII, the Company may omit from its proxy materials any information or 
Statement that it believes would violate any applicable law, rule, regulation or listing 
requirement. 
Amended and Restated Bylaws of General Electric, supra note 193, at 9. 
209 See supra Part II.C. 
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distress.  A key benefit to a targeted proxy access bylaw, however, is that it focuses the 
use of proxy access on instances that more objectively warrant intervention.210 
 
C. Potential Challenges to Targeted Proxy Access 
 
Notwithstanding the suggested benefits to targeted proxy access, implementation 
may encounter resistance.  For example, boards may oppose such a bylaw because it still 
impedes on autonomy and, unlike general proxy access, suggests that the board may fail 
at some point in the future.  Likewise, shareholders may not believe the proposal goes far 
enough. And as with any new initiative, there are costs to being among the first to adopt 
the proposal, including risks associated with the untested effectiveness of the concept and 
increases in the cost of credit.  This part briefly addresses the potential concerns of each 
side to this debate. 
 
Proxy access (whether targeted or general) can subject management to increased 
scrutiny and challenge.  General proxy access introduces the possibility that management 
will devote time and money defending its position and warding off proxy access contests 
on an annual basis.211  Under the timeline used in many proxy access bylaws, that could 
consume three to four months out of every year.212  That is a significant period of time 
during which management may be distracted by things arguably external to the core 
operations of the business.  Although hopefully shareholders would be more selective and 
thoughtful in invoking proxy access rights, the concern has merit. 
 
A targeted proxy access bylaw would mitigate this concern by defining the situations 
in which proxy access will be available.  It would not be an annual contest.  It also would 
be somewhat in the control of the board to manage.  A board may not always be able to 
anticipate events causing operational or financial distress, but it does often have red flags 
warning of potential problems.213  A targeted proxy access bylaw may encourage boards 
to more readily see and address such red flags.  That said, the trigger of the targeted 
proxy access bylaw as the company is facing a distressed situation arguably could be 
more disruptive than in other circumstances.  For this reason, the balance discussed above 
in defining the triggers is critical.   
 
A shareholder likewise may oppose targeted proxy access in favor of a more general 
approach that would give shareholders access in any annual election.214  This perspective 
is understandable, given that shareholders cannot predict in advance when they would 
like to intervene more directly in management’s decisions.  Activist shareholders do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 See notes 192-197 and accompanying text (discussing competing considerations and balance struck by 
targeted proxy access). 
211 See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to general proxy access). 
212 See supra note 193, 203 and accompanying text (providing example of language used in advance notice 
and general proxy access bylaws). 
213 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing management’s delay in addressing distress 
and harmful effects for company). 
214 See supra notes 7, 15, 188 and accompanying text (discussing arguments of proponents of general proxy 
access). 
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limit their campaigns to distressed situations.  Rather, they often seek changes at 
companies that otherwise are profitable and stable.215  Notably, the targeted proxy access 
bylaw would not prevent them from pursuing those campaigns.  It would, however, limit 
their ability to use the company’s proxy materials to situations defined in the bylaw 
triggers.   
 
These potential concerns are not new.  In fact, some were raised with respect to the 
SEC’s 2003 contingent proxy access proposal, which would have given shareholders the 
ability to nominate directors under certain circumstances unrelated to a company’s 
financial health, as well as during its consideration of Rule 14a-11.216  Supporters of 
triggers believed “that such a requirement would serve as a useful indicator of the 
companies with demonstrated governance issues.”217   Those who opposed triggers 
expressed “concern that triggering events would cause significant delays and introduce 
complexity into the rule.”218  The SEC ultimately elected not to include triggers in 
Rule 14a-11 because, among other things, it suggested that a limited federal proxy rule 
might not give full effect to shareholders’ state law rights.219 
 
The advantages and disadvantages to targeted proxy access noted in the context of 
the SEC’s rulemaking process are generally valid points.  The question in many ways 
becomes what are the objectives of federal proxy rules, and how can they best protect 
shareholders’ rights.  Shareholders should have the ability to exercise their state law 
rights to vote on directors.  Should they also have the ability, however, to nominate 
directors in all cases?220  Part of the related challenge is the diverse and often very 
dispersed nature of public company shareholders, as well as the fact that shareholders 
generally owe no fiduciary duties to the company or other shareholders.221  A company 
and arguably even applicable law better protect the interests of all shareholders if the 
designated fiduciaries (i.e., boards) have the ability to nominate directors, subject to 
appropriate safeguards in situations where boards fail in their duties. 
 
Targeted proxy access strikes that balance, pursing a path in the first instance that 
allows the company’s fiduciaries to nominate directors and operate the business in the 
best interests of the company and all shareholders.  Individual shareholders who 
potentially have competing interests or adverse agendas do not initially have those rights, 
but the board knows those shareholders may gain such rights in certain circumstances.  
As one proponent of triggers suggests, “‘triggered’ proxy access would give shareholders 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 See supra notes Parts II.A, II.B (discussing various objectives of activist campaigns). 
216 See SEC RELEASE NOS. 33-9136, 34-62764, supra note 17, at 46-47. 
217 Id. at 48. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 For a thoughtful exploration of shareholders’ rights under state law and how the right to vote and the 
right to nominate interact, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, DEL. J. CORP. L. 117 
(2014). 
221 See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min. Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (“Under Delaware 
law a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the 
business affairs of the corporation.”). 
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an avenue for dealing with unresponsive boards, but protect companies from the threat of 
a proxy access challenge in the absence of serious governance or strategic matter.”222   
 
Interestingly, neither side necessarily wins by adopting a targeted proxy access 
bylaw, but each side has the potential to succeed in the long run.  A board may also 
proactively adopt a targeted proxy access bylaw to signal strength and confidence to the 
market, backstopped by the shareholders’ proxy access as defined in the bylaw 
triggers.223  Although no board likes to admit the potential for failure, it is a reality of 
doing business.  Targeted proxy access allows a board to define the parameters of the 
accountability tool and thereby eliminate the need for a more general proxy access bylaw. 
 
Finally, boards may anticipate lenders increasing the cost of credit if the company 
adopts a board- or shareholder-proposed targeted proxy access bylaw.  This concern, 
although understandable, does not withstand scrutiny, provided that the bylaw is adopted 
prior to any operational or financial distress. Lenders extending credit to a financially 
healthy company likely would view such a bylaw as a neutral or positive attribute.224  To 
the extent the bylaw is appropriately designed, the bylaw also should protect the lenders’ 
investment and strengthen the company’s ability to repay the debt upon maturity.  A 
distressed debt investor looking to take over the company through a bankruptcy or out-of-
court restructuring may not approve of a targeted proxy access bylaw, but such investors 
often have a different agenda or assessment of the company’s risk profile.225  A distressed 
debt investor may view targeted proxy access as a potential impediment to a rescue loan 
or refinancing structure that protects the investor on the downside through significant 
lender control provisions.  Notably, this is exactly the kind of leverage the proposal seeks 
in part to mitigate. 
 
As with any proposal, the effectiveness of targeted proxy access lies in the details of 
each company’s bylaw.  The underlying objectives of incentivizing proactive 
management of financial or operational distress and increasing accountability for related 
failures should guide the development of the proposal.  Moreover, these objectives and 
the balanced approached offered by targeted proxy access make it a useful tool for both 
boards and shareholders interested in the long-term success of the company. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 ALLIANCE ADVISORS, ANOTHER BUSY YEAR AHEAD FOR PROXY ACCESS, NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2016 
(describing position of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Fund). 
223  Ratings agencies could consider whether companies have adopted targeted proxy access as an 
appropriate oversight mechanism to protect the company’s financial health in rating a company’s debt.  
224 See Jayanthi Sunder et al., Debtholder Responses to Shareholder Activism:  Evidence from Hedge Fund 
Interventions, 27 REV. FIN. STUDIES 3318 (2014) (“We compare loan spreads before and after intervention 
and show the effects of heterogeneous shareholder actions. Spreads increase when shareholder activism 
relies on the market for corporate control or financial restructuring. In contrast, spreads decrease when 
activists address managerial entrenchment.”). 
225 See supra Part II.B. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Boards make hard decisions.  They are called upon to vet various opportunities and 
alternatives for their companies and, in the process, must determine the best way forward.  
Although directors’ fiduciary duties flow to the corporate entity and, in most situations, 
shareholders, directors’ decisions affect numerous other individuals and entities.226  The 
voices and interests of these other parties can make even simple decisions noisy and 
complex, and may influence directors’ deliberations. 
 
Noise and complexity grow as a company’s profitability shrinks.  Boards of 
distressed companies face competing demands from creditors, shareholders, and 
employees.  The decisions at hand are of the “bet the company” nature, and the stakes are 
extremely high.  Moreover, the directors’ fiduciary duties typically remain unchanged, 
but the company’s senior debtholders may be the only parties at the negotiating table.227  
Boards, their companies, and their shareholders would benefit from activism that 
balances leverage and also helps boards make better decisions. 
 
The targeted proxy access bylaw would do exactly that.228  The proposal would 
channel shareholder activism to situations in most need of intervention.  It would allow 
qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain percentage of the board, thereby 
introducing new perspectives and potentially targeted expertise to the board.  It also 
would facilitate the dissemination of additional information to shareholders—information 
that may counter management’s story and challenge the status quo.  Unlike a more 
general proxy access bylaw, however, directors would not be open to proxy access 
contests on an annual basis and would face such contests only if they fail to navigate any 
operational or financial distress in a timely manner.229   
 
Although any proxy access can facilitate needed intervention in times of distress, a 
targeted proxy access bylaw strikes a better balance.  It gives a board the autonomy 
necessary to run a company effectively, but provides a safety valve for shareholders in 
the event the board fails.  Overall, such a bylaw offers a reasonable compromise to the 
proxy access debate and has the potential to help companies and shareholders preserve 
value in distressed situations. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 See supra Part I.B. 
227 See generally supra Parts I.B, II.B. 
228 See supra Part III.B. 
229 See id. 
